Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Art. 78 Petitions

Court Litigation Documents

Art. 78 Petition - FUSL000094 (2021-05-27)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/art78_petition

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

INDEX NO.

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF SULLIVAN
X
In the Matter of the Application of

I

Index #

Petitioner,
For a judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules,
:

-againstTINA M. STANFORD, Chairwoman of the New
York State Board of Parole,

Respondents.
X

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

Elyse D. Echtman
Rochelle F. Swartz
Kristin Schwam
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
51 West 52nd Street
New York, New York 10019
Tel: (212) 506-5000
rswartz@orrick.com
Sydney Hargrove
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
Columbia Center
1152 15 th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
Tel: (202) 339- 8400

Janet E. Sabel
Lawrence T. Hausman
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY
Criminal Appeals Bureau
199 Water Street, 5th Floor
New York, New York 10038
Tel: (646) 689-5537
Attorneys for Petitioner

1 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

I

JURISDICTION

4

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

A.

The Underlying Crime

B.

Mr.

C.

Productive Activity While Incarcerated

12

D.

Clean Disciplinary Record and “Low” Risk Assessment

13

E.

Family Support and Reentry Plan

14

F.

The Board’s 2020 Decision Denying Parole

15

6

’s Remorse and Growth as an Adult

10

ARGUMENT

15

I.

THE DECISION WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION

16

A.

The Decision was Intended to Moot the Article 78 Appeal

16

B.

The Decision was Meant to Correct Glaring Problems in the 2019 Decision

17

C.

The Hostility Displayedby Commissioner Segarra Supports the Conclusion that
Denial was a Foregone Conclusion

18

The Decision is Based on Politics, Not Reason

18

D.

II.
III.

IV.

V.

THE DECISION IS SUBJECT TO REVERSAL BECAUSE IT IS CONCLUSORY
AND EVADES JUDICIAL REVIEW

21

THE DECISION IS SUBJECT TO REVERSAL BECAUSE IT IS PREDICATED
UPON TWO FACTUALLY INCORRECT ASSERTIONS

23

THE DECISION IS SUBJECT TO REVERSAL BECAUSE THE CONCLUSION
THAT MR.
IS NOT REHABILITATED IS CONTRADICTED BY THE
FACTS

25

THE DECISION IS SUBJECT TO REVERSAL BECAUSE THE BOARD FAILED TO
ABIDE BY ITS STATUTORY MANDATE

25

A.

The Board Improperly Weighed a Non- Statutory Factor That Counsels in Favor
of Release as A Factor Against Release

26

B.

The Decision Relies on “Community Opposition,” a Non- Statutory Factor

28

C.

The Decision Relies On “Official Opposition,” A Non-Statutory Factor

31

VI.

THE DECISION FAILS TO EXPLAIN ITS DEPARTURE FROM COMPAS

32

VII.

THE DECISION IS BASED SOLELY ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE
UNDERLYING OFFENSE

35

THE DECISION VIOLATES MR.

37

VIII.

A.

’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Due Process-Secured Sixth Amendment Protections Apply to Parole Proceedings

l

2 of 84

38

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page

IX.

B.

The Decision Relies on Facts Not Found by A Jury

40

C.

The Decision Increases Mr.

’s Mandatory Minimum Sentence ,

42

D.

The Decision Increases Mr.

s Mandatory Maximum Sentence

43

THE DECISION VIOLATES MR.
A.

B.
X.

45

The Decision Violates MrI
.
Decision Fails to Afford Mr.

47

’s Eighth Amendment Rights Because the

a Meaningful Opportunity for Release .

THE PETITION IS NOT MOOT

B.

49

This Appeal Fits Squarely Within a Recognized Exception to the
Mootness Doctrine

50

The March 2021 Decision Repeats the Same Errors as the Decision
Underlying This Petition

53

THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ORDER RELEASE

A.

45

The Decision Violates Mr.
’s EightliAmendment Rights Because the
BoardFailed to Appropriately Consider Mr.
’s Youth at the Time of the
Offense

A.

XI.

’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Basic Principles of Statutory Interpretation Demonstrate That Previous Decisions
on This Issue Are Erroneous
1.

2.

53

54

Plain meaning, context, and legislative history demonstrate the breadth
of this Court’s authority

54

Caselaw concerning the Article 78 court’s authority to order release is
erroneous, such that this Court may decline to follow precedent

57

B.

The 2011 Parole Revisions Instilled a Liberty Interest in Parole Procedure

62

C.

The Ability of Courts to Convert Habeas Corpus Proceedings into Article 78
Petitions is Indicative of Judicial Authority to Order Release

62

D.

The Rule of Lenity Supports This Court’s Authority to Order Release

63

E.

The Board of Parole Lacks Any Special Expertise That Might Undermine the
Article 78 Court’s Authority to Overrule BoardDecisions

65

1.

Politics, not expertise, underlies the Board of Parole

65

2.

Parole disputes originate in the court system, making judges appropriate
arbiters of disputedparole determinations

66

Interpreting Article 78 as Curtailing Judicial Authority to Order Release Renders
the Statute Unconstitutional

66

Logic andPublic Policy Considerations Mandate the Conclusion that Article 78
Judges Have Authority to Order Parole Release

66

F.

G.

67

CONCLUSION

it

3 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)
Cases

Alleyne v. United States ,
570 U.S. 99 (2013)

38, 39, 40, 43

Almendarez-Torres v. United States ,
523 U.S. 224 (1998)

39

Altria Grp,, Inc. v. Good,
555 U.S. 70 (2008) ..

16, 67

Matter of Applewhite,
167 A.D.3 d 1380 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)

27, 28, 29

Apprendi v. New Jersey ,
530 U.S. 466 (2000)

passim

Bailey v. McDougall ,
66 Misc.2d 161 (Sup. Ct. 1970), aff’d, 36 A.D.2d 903 (2d Dep’t 1971)
Benson v. Stanford,
No. 978/2019, Decision, Order, and Judgment (Dutchess Cty. Apr. 27, 2020)

Bingv. Thunig,
2 N.Y.2d 656 (1957)

58
20, 35

60

Birdsong v. Nurture, Inc .,
275 F. Supp. 3d 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)

16, 67

Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 496 (2004)

passim

Bottom v. Stanford,
No. E2020-745 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. Aug 10, 2020)

Bresnickv . Saypol ,
57 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1945), modified on other grounds , 270 A.D. 837 (1st
Dep’t 1946
Brown v. Commissioner of N.Y.S. Dep ’t of Correctional Serv .,
70 A.D.2d 1039 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)

Bruetsch v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr . & Cmty. Supervision,
No. 0230-14, 2014 WL 1910238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. May 11, 2014)
Brunner v. Russi ,
182 A.D.2d 1136 (4th Dep’t 1992)

24

57, 58
29
21, 22

61

m
4 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
v. Stanford, Appellate Division, Second Department Docket No. 2017-07216,
Dutchess County Supreme Court Index No. 50465/ 17 (Jan. 8, 2020)

3, 7, 48

v. Stanford,

Index No. E2020-1001 (Sullivan Cty. Sup. Ct. 2020)

passim

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc .,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)

64

Matter of Coaxum v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
827 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2006)..

25

Coleman v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr . & Cmty . Supervision
157 A.D.3 d 672 (2d Dep’t 2018)

24, 33

Comfort v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
No. 1445 /2018 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Dec. 21, 2018)

33

Matter of Comfort v. New York State Div . of Parole,
68 A.D.3d 1295 (3 d Dep’t 2009)

15

Dinsio v . Supreme Court,
125 A.D.3 d 1313 (4th Dep’t 2015)

58

Donawitz v . Danek,
42 N.Y.2d 138 (1977)

59

People ex rel. Donohoe v . Montanye,
35 N.Y.2d 221 (1974)

53

Matter of Duffy v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr . & Community Supervision,
132 A.D.3 d 1207 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)

27, 29

Dunne v . Harnett,
92 Misc.2d 48 (Sup. Ct. 1977), affd, 59 A.D.2d 1065 (1st Dep’t 1977)

57

Endresz v. Friedberg,
24 N.Y.2d 478 (1969)

60

Esquivel-Quintana v . Lynch,
810 F.3 d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016)

64

Eerrante v. Stanford,
172 A.D.3 d 31 (2d Dep’t 2019)

36

Friedgood v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
22 A.D.3d 950 (3d Dep’t 2005)

54

tv

5 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
Fuller v. Evans ,
586 Fed. App’x 825 (2d Cir. 2014)

62

Gamble v. United States ,
139 S.Ct. 1960 (2019)

58, 59

People ex rel. Ganci v . Henderson,
54 A.D.2d 609 (4th Dep’t 1976)

63

Girard v. Glens Falls ,
173 A.D.2d 113 (3rd Dep’t 1991)

61

Gonmler v. Annucci ,
136 A.D.3 d 909 (2d Dep’t 2016)

58

Gonzalez v. Annucci ,
32 N.Y.3d 461 (2018)

51, 53

Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48 (2010)

46, 49

Grifenhagen v. Ordway ,
218 N.Y. 451 (1916)

60

Gundy v . United States ,
139 S.Ct. 2116 (2019)

56

Hartjev. Coughlin,
70 N.Y.2d 866 (1987)

61

Hawkins v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr . & Cmty. Supervision ,
30 N.Y.S.3 d 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)

People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
97 A.D.2d 128 (1st Dep’t 1983)

Hill v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
No. 100121/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9462 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Oct. 23, 2020)
Hopps v. N. Y. State Bd. of Parole,
Decision and Order Index No. 2553/ 18 (Sup. Ct. Orange Cty. 2018)

passim

62
50, 51, 52, 54
31, 32

Howland v. Henderson,
54 A.D.2d 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)

29

Huntley v. Evans ,
910 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2d Dep’t 2010)

37

v
6 of 84

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

INDEX NO.
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
Jennings v. Stanford,
No. 2020-51294, Decision & Order (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Sept. 17, 2020)

Johnson v. New York State Bd of Parole,
65 A.D.3d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009)

23, 24, 33, 37

16, 37

Jones v . Mississippi ,
593 U. S.
(2021)

3, 44, 49

Jones v . United States ,
526 U.S. 227 (1999)

37

Kimmel v . State,
29 N.Y.3d 386 (2017)

57

Kindlerv . City of New York,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160253 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2019)

63

Kingv . Landreman,
No. 19-CV-338, Dkt. No. 6 (W.D. Wis. June 24, 2019)

38

King v . New York State Div. of Parole,
190 A.D.2d 423 (1st Dep’t 1993), aff’d, 83 N.Y.2d 788 ( 1994)
King v . New York State Div. of Parole,
83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994)

29, 31, 60
59, 60

Kirklin v. United States ,
883 F.3 d 993 (7th Cir. 2018)

38

Lebron v. Alexander ,
68 A.D.3d 1476 (3 d Dep’t 2009)

53

Leocal v. Ashcroft ,
543 U.S. 1 (2004)

64

Licitrav . Coughlin ,
93 A.D.2d 349 (3rd Dep’t 1983)

60

Linares v . Annucci,
710 Fed. App’x 467 (2d Cir. 2017)

63

Lovell v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole,
40 A.D.3d 1166 (3 d Dep’t 2007)

50, 51, 53

Maierv . Coughlin,
193 A.D.2d 1015 (3 d Dep’t 1993)

61

vi

7 of 84

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

INDEX NO.
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
Marino v. Travis ,
13 A.D. 453 (2d Dep’t 2004)

51, 52, 53

Mayfield v. Evans ,
938 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

21

McLaurin v. N. Y.S. Bd. of Parole,
27 A.D.3d 565 (2d Dep’t 2006)

50, 51, 52, 53

In re Melinda D.,
31 A.D.3d 24 (2d Dep’t 2006)

51

People ex rel. Merced v. Warden, Otis Bantum Correctional Ctr .,
No. 250538/07, 2008 WL 211530019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2008)

63

Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York,
No. 2010-06556, 2011 WL 6825539 (2d Dep’t 2011)

55

Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)

3, 44, 46, 49

Miranda v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
No. 150995 /2020, Decision & Order (Sup. Ct. New York Cty. Oct. 13, 2020)

Mitthauer v. Patterson,
8 N.Y.2d 37 (1960)

37, 50

56

Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 SCt. 718 (2016)..

passim

Morris v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr . & Cmty. Supervision,
40 Misc. 3 d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cty. 2013)

16, 37

Morris v. New York State Department of Corrections ,
963 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cty. 2013)

22

Mullaneyv. Wilbur ,
421 U.S. 684 (1975)

43

Matter of Newton v. Dennison,
47 A.D.3d 538 (1st Dep’t 2008)

59

Matter of Pantelidis v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals ,
43 A.D.3d 314 (1st Dep't 2007), affd, 10 N.Y.3 d 846 (2008)
Matter of Pell v . Bd. of Educ.,
34 N.Y.2d 222 (1994)

62, 65

15

vu
8 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
People v. Bing,
76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990)

59

People v. Brodie,
37 N.Y. 2d 100 (N.Y. 1975)

45

People v. Hogan,
No. 18, 2016 WL 633920 (2dDep’tFeb. 18, 2016)

59

People v. Prindle,
29 N.Y.3d 463 (N.Y. 2017)

38

People v . Turner ,
5 N.Y.3 d 476 (2005)

59

People ex rel. Perdue v. Jablonsky ,
174 Misc.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. 1997)

58

Piersma on behalf of Majors v. Henderson,
44 N.Y.2d 982 (N.Y. 1978)

63

Platt v . New York State Bd. of Parole,
47 Misc. 3 d 1059 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. 2015)

37

Police Benev . Ass'n of State Trooper v. Vacco,
253 A.D.2d 920 (3rd Dep’t 1998)

61

Policemen ’s Benev. Ass ’n of Westchester County , Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Village of
Croton-on -Hudson,
21 A.D.2d 693 (2d Dep't 1964)

56

Quartararo v. New York State Div. of Parole,
224 A.D.2d 266 (1st Dep’t 1996)

59

Rabenbauer v . New York State Dep ’t of Corr . & Cmty. Supervision,
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 24347 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. Nov 12, 2014)

33

Rabenbauer v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision,
995 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. 2014)

21

Rakaric v. Croation Cultural Club,
76 A.D.2d 619 (2d Dep’t 1980)

60

Ramirez v. Stanford,
No. 1928/2016 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Feb. 7, 2017)

30

Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002)

44

Vlll

9 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
Rivera v . Stanford,
No. 50638/ 17, 2019 WL 2030503 (2d Dep’t 2019)

24, 45, 52

Robinson v. Stanford,
No. 2392/2018 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Mar. 13, 2019)

33

Rodriguez v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
No. 8670/2015, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5111 (Sup. Ct. Orange Cty. Feb. 25, 2016)

22

People ex rel. Rosenthal v . Wolfson ,
48 N.Y.2d 230 (N.Y. 1979)

63

Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
146 A.D.3 d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016)

59

Rossakis v . New York State Bd. of Parole,
196 A.D.3 d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016)

36

Matter of Simonson v . Cahn ,
27 N.Y.2d 1 (1970)

59, 60

Solem v . Helm,
463 U.S. 277 (1983)

68

People ex rel. South v. Hammock,
80 A.D.2d 947 (3d Dep’t 1981)

63

Southern Union Co. v. U.S.,
567 U.S. 343 (2012)

39,

Speed v. Regan,
50 A.D.2d 1100 (4th Dep’t 1975)

60

People ex rel. Spencer v. Goord,
179 Misc. 2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1998)

63

Standley v . New York State Div. of Parole,
34 A.D.3d 1169 (3 d Dep’t 2006)

51, 53

State v . Cities Service Co.,
No. 64300, 1992 WL 34289 (3 d Dep’t, Feb. 20, 1992)

55

Thompson v. Oklahoma,

487 U.S. 815 (1988)

45

Town ofAurora v . Village of East Aurora,
32 N.Y.3d 366 (2018)

55

tx

10 of 84

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

INDEX NO.
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
U.S. v. Scully ,
108 F. Supp. 3d 59 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

64

U.S. v. Thompson/Center Arms Co .,
504 U.S. 505 (1992)

64

United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506, 510 ( 1995)

39

United States v. Haymond,
139 S.Ct. 2369 (2019)

38, 39, 40

United States v. Ventura,
742 Fed. App’x. 575 (2d. Cir. 2018)

38

Voii v. Stanford,
No. 50485 /2020 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. May 13, 2020)

32

Matter of West v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
No. 3069- 13, 2013 WL 5657701 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. Sept. 24, 2013)

21, 22

Westchester County Soc.for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Mengel,
266 A.D. 151 (2d Dep’t 1943), affd, 292 N.Y. 121 (1944)

55

People ex rel. Yates v . Walters ,
111 A.D.2d 839 (2d Dep' t 1985)

63

Statutes

9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2

52

9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a)

32, 35

9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3

21

9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8006.1

5

9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8006.3(a)(1)

15

9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8006.4(c)

5

9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 98002.2(a)

33

Civil Practice Act

57

C.P.L.R. Article 78

passim

C.P.L.R. § 506

4

x
11 of 84

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

INDEX NO.
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
C.P.L.R. § 5011

56

C.P.L.R. § 5104

56

C.P.L.R. § 7801

4

C.P.L.R. § 7803

56

C.P.L.R. § 7806

56, 58

Exec. L. § 259-i

passim

Exec. L. § 259-c (McKinney 2010)

62

Exec. L. § 259-c (McKinney 2012)

62

Exec. L. § 259(c)(4)

34

Social Services Law § 374-a

51

U.S. CONST.

64, 67

U.S. CONST, amend V

55

U.S. CONST, amend VI

passim

U.S. CONST, amend VIII

passim

U.S. CONST, amend XIV

3, 37, 55

U.S. CONST, article VI § 2

16, 67

Other Authorities
24 Carmody-Wait 2d § 145:375

58

28 N.Y. Jur. 2d Courts and Judges § 232

60

6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 1

57

6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 2

57

6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 79

57

6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 341

63

6A N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 403

56,

xi

12 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
Alexandra O. Cohen and BJ Casey, Rewiring juvenile justice: the intersection of
developmental neuroscience and legal policy , Massachusetts General Hospital,
Center for Law, Brain & Behavior (Feb. 2014) (available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5mj6qpt) (last visited Jan. 11, 2021)

61

American Civil Liberties Union, False Hope: How Parole Systems Fail Youth Serving
Extreme Sentences (Nov. 2016) (available at https://tinyurl.com/r9r4epc) (last visited
Jan. 11, 2021)

61

Beatriz Luna, The Relevance of Immaturities in the Juvenile Brain to Culpability and
Rehabilitation, 63 Hastings LJ. 1469 (2012) (available at
https://repository.uchastings.edU/hastings_lawJoumal/vol63/iss6/2) (last visited May
26, 2021)

42, 47

Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343 (1769)
Centers for Disease Control andPrevention, Safety and Children with Disabilities,
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4xmjurr (last visited July 13, 2020)

38

9

Christopher Zoukis, Report Highlights Shortcomings of New York ’s Parole Board (Jan. 8,
2019) (available at https://tinyurl.com/mapwga) (last visited May 26, 2021)

19

Coalition for Juvenile Justice, Adolescent Brain Development, at Section 1.2 (available at
https://tinyurl.com/y24ct4a7) (last visited Jan. 11, 2021)

61

DavidFinkelhor andRichard Ormrod, Child Abuse Reported to the Police, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, United States Department of Justice
(2001) (available at https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/child-abusereported-police) (last visited May 26, 2021)

7

David P. Bryden andMaren M. Grier, The Search for Rapists’ “Real” Motives, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 171, (2013) (available at
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestem.edu/jclc /voll01/iss 1/5) (last visited May
26, 2021)

41

Disability Justice, Abuse and Exploitation of People with Developmental Disabilities
(available at https://disabilityjustice.org/justice-denied/abuse-and-exploitation/) (last
visited May 26, 2021)

7

DOCCS, Directive No. 8500: COMPAS Assessment/Case Plan, Nov. 19, 2015 (available
at https://doccs.ny.gov/system /files/documents/2020/02/ 8500.pdf)

34

Editorial Board, New York Forgets Its Juvenile Lifers , New York Times (Mar. 24, 2018)
(available at https://tinyurl.com/t2y66jn) (last visited Jan. 11, 2021)

61

Jarrett Murphy, Advocates Press Albany to Fix New York ’s Parole System (Jan. 30, 2019)
(available at https://tinyurl.com/rqx623m) (last visited May 26, 2021)

19

Xll

13 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview , The Sentencing Project (July
2019)

7

Kimberly Thomas, Paul Reingold, From Grace to Grids : Rethinking Due Process
Protectionfor Parole, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213 (2017)

38

Letter from Clarendon to W. Pym (Jan. 27, 1766), in 1 Papers of John Adams 169 (R.
Taylor ed. 1977)

40

Let” s Fight For and Stand With Our Crime Victims (May 7, 2019) (available at
https://tinyurl.com/y2ijlv7p) (last visited May 26, 2021)

20

McKinney’s Penal Law § 125.25 (1990)

42

Morgan Tyler, Understanding the Adolescent Brain and Legal Culpability , American Bar
Association (Aug. 2015) (available at https://tinyurl.com/yy3j7b4b) (last visited Jan.
11, 2021)

61

Nazgol Ghandnoosh, The Next Step: Ending Excessive Punishment for Violent Crimes
(Apr. 2019) (available at https://tinyurl.com/y3 th4dq8)
New York State Parole Board: Failures in Staffing and Performance, Fordham Law
Archive of Scholarship and History (2018) (available at
https://tinyurl.com/y4yguggh) (last visited May 26, 2021)

19, 20

19

Nikita Stewart, Child Abuse Cases Drop 51 Percent. The Authorities Are Very Worried,
New York Times (Aug. 7, 2020)

7

Prevent Child Abuse America, Preventing Emotional Abuse (available at
https://tinyurl.com/ycl3x5w7) (last visited July 15, 2020)

9

RAPP Campaign, Parole Justice Advances as Legislature Closes-But Not Far Enough
(Jun. 19, 2019)

18

Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles : Eighth Amendment Limits and
Sixth Amendment Rights , 56 B.C. L. REV. 553 (2015)

38

Sen. Helming Urges Governor to Join Fight to Deny Parole for Teen’s Killers (July 3,
- .com/y2uox4qe) (last visited May 26, 2021)
2019) (available at https://tinyiul

20

Siegel, N.Y. Prac. § 570 (6th ed.)

56

The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)

59

The Sentencing Project, Still Life: America 's Increasing Use ofLife and Long-Term
Sentences (May 3, 2017)

61

xm
14 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel : Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and
the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893 (2009)

xiv

15 of 84

38

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

INDEX NO.
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

i

1
16 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

ARGUMENT19

When considering an appeal from a decisionrendered by the Board of Parole, the relevant inquiry
is whether the Board's decision “was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, was

arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise unlawful /’ 9 NYCRR § 8006.3(a)(1). Under New York
jurisprudence, determining whether a decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion depends
upon “whether the determination has a rational or adequate basis,” Matter

of Pell v, Bd of Educ,, 34

N.Y.2d 222, 231 ( 1994). An “[ arbitrary action is without basis in reason and is generally taken without

regard to the facts.” Id, As applied to decisions of the Board of Parole, appellate review assesses “whether
the Board followed the [statute ] andrendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the

facts in the record.” Matter of Comfort v. New York State Div. of Parole, 68 A.D.3 d 1295, 1296 (3 d Dep’t
2009). To the extent the Decision violates Mr.

19

Mr,

's rights under federal law, it is unlawful. See

specifically adopts and asserts the arguments raised in Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 19, and 20,
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generally Birdsong v. Nurture, Inc ., 275 F. Supp. 3 d 384, 387 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Altria Grp., Inc. v.
Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008)) (“Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, state laws

that conflict with federal law are without effect and are preempted/’).

The Decision underlying this Petition is arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful. Any one of the
shortcomings detailed below is enough to warrant a finding that Mr.

’s parole denial should be

vacated.
I*

THE DECISION WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION

Indication that a parole denial was predetermined is grounds for reversal. Johnson v. New York
State Bd of Parole, 65 A.D.3 d 838, 839 (4th Dep’ t 2009) (“We therefore conclude on the record before us

that the Parole Board failed to weigh all of the relevant statutory factors and that there is a strong indication
that the denial of petitioner ’s application was a foregone conclusion.”) (internal citations omitted); see also
Morris v, New York State Dep ’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc.3 d 226, 233 (Sup, Ct. 2013)
(“When, as here, the Parole Board focuses entirely on the nature of Petitioner’s crime, there is a strong

indication that the denial of parole is a foregone conclusion that does not comport with statutory
requirements.”). In this case, denial was a foregone conclusion, such that the Decision is subject to reversal.
A.

The Decision was Intended to Moot the Article 78 Appeal*

Mr.

.

.

was denied parole release for the sixth time in August 2019 See Exhibit 1 He

perfected his administrative appeal from that decision on March 10, 2020. The four-month period within
which the Appeals Unit was entitled to decide the administrative appeal expired on July 10, 2020, Since the
Appeals Unit had not issued a decision by that deadline, Mr,

filed an Article 78 Petition in the

Supreme Court, Sullivan County, on July 24, 2020. Purportedly on the same date, the Appeals Unit issued a

decision granting Mr.

counsel for Mr.

a de novo hearing (though it failed to provide timely notice of that fact to

ft. Mr.

attended the de novo hearing on August 11, 2020, where he was

.

once again denied release, now for the seventh time

In November 2020, the Attorney General moved to dismiss the Article 78 Petition from the 2019

denial as moot in light of the 2020 denial. In that case, Respondent has suggested that mere coincidence—
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and not intent to moot this appeal—underlies the date of the Appeals Unit decision. Mr.
respectfully disagrees, and asserts that this dens ex machina is altogether too convenient not to be suspect
He asserts that the 2020 interview was never meant to actually provide him with an opportunity for release.

Instead, the interview was meant to create a mootness argument for the Board to raise in the Article 78

proceeding so that the Supreme Court would decline to address the merits of the appeal.
B*

The Decision was Meant to Correct Glaring Problems in the 2019 Decision*

Insofar as the 2020 interview served any purpose besides mooting Mr,

's appeal from the

2019 decision, the Decision looks to be an attempt to shore up the glaring inadequacies and irrationality in

the August 2019 decision, and to foreclose arguments concerning the Eighth Amendment implications of
his continued incarceration. This is evident not only in the conclusion (/. e., there is no lawful basis to deny

parole to Mr,

, yet the Decision nonetheless concludes that Mr.

should not be released

.

on parole), but also in the interview transcript itself

During the 2020 interview, Commissioner Agostini acknowledged the amount of material in Mr.

.

's parole file, which numbers in the hundreds of pages She said: “Ihave a lot of reading to do,

Eve done some reading in advance of this interview, and HI be working with the file and continuing to

read through it as well after our interview.” Exhibit 2 at 5:12- 15. At the conclusion of the interview,

Commissioner Agostini said: “Thank you for your closing remarks, for the interview, for all the materials
that you've put together. Truly is [ sic ] a lot to go through but we will go through it, we will deliberate, and

.

.

we'll get a decision in writing to you probably next week, okay?” Id at 40:23-25, 41:1-2 Meanwhile, the

Decision—though dated August 18, 2020 on the transcript, and August 19, 2020 on the written form—
notably states, “this panel is concerned about what comes across as a lack of emotion on your part .,,
observed by this panel todayT (emphasis added). Meaning, despite assuring Mr.

that the panel

would take a thorough look through his parole file to consider all of the facts, the language of the Decision

indicates that the panel in fact issued their decision on the same day as Mr.

's interview, when

they admitted that they had not read the materials he submitted. This demonstrates that the interview was

.

never genuine: the Commissioners knew they were going to deny Mr
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merely stated that they were considering all of the information in the parole packet in an attempt to
foreclose Mr.

a

>

.20

s arguments on appeal

The Hostility Displayed by Commissioner Segarra Supports the Conclusion that
Denial was a Foregone Conclusion*

The obvious hostility from Commissioner Segarra towards Mr.

also demonstrates that

the Decision was predetermined. See Exhibit 2 at 35-39 (insinuating Petitioner lied when he explained that
he was upset following the crime because he must have “just snapfped] out of it,” then asking if he had a

“good day.,.a good game” after the crime, then asking whether, before leaving the crime scene, “[d]id you
puke ,,, did you spit on the ground .... did you pray?”, and then asking “[ t ]he sex crime, were you
aroused, was it pleasurable to you?”). Based on the transcript of the interview, there was no reason for

Commissioner Segarra to feel contempt towards Mr.

, He

was respectful and forthcoming in all of

his answers, and had the Commissioners read his parole application in full, they would have known he has

all the markers of a rehabilitated man who regrets the crime he committed as a child. The only reason
Commissioner Segarra couldhave for this contempt is the preexisting belief that a person convicted of a
crime as serious as Mr.

?

.

s should never be released on parole Obviously, the Commissioners had

.

no intention of sincerely considering Mr

D*

for release.

The Decision is Based on Politics, Not Reason*

The New York Board of Parole is made up entirely of political appointees. See Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), About the Board. There is no requirement that any
of these appointees possess specialized expertise or training—in psychiatry, psychology, criminology, law,

.

or otherwise—for appointees to qualify for positions on the Board See generally RAPP Campaign, Parole

Justice Advances as Legislature Closes—But Not Far Enough (Jun. 19, 2019) (detailing the failures in the
nomination of Board Commissioners by Governor Andrew Cuomo in 2019 including, “[h]alf of the

candidates put forward by the Governor came from prosecutorial or law enforcement backgrounds,” and

20

Likewise, the fact that the Board cited not one, but two factual inaccuracies in the Decision merely reaffirms this
point. See infra.
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“[ t ]he Cuomo administration also shared no information on how they sourced candidates,” and the like).
Indeed, the primary qualifier for appointment (and reappointment) appears to be the would-be

Commissioner 's ties to politicians.
For instance, Commissioner William Smith, who has been on the Board for approximately 20

.

years, has made numerous large political donations to State Senator Patrick M Gallivan, See Christopher

Zoukis, Report Highlights Shortcomings of New York 's Parole Board (Jan. 8, 2019) (available at
https://tinyurl,com/ruapwga). Smith has also made substantial contributions to Senator Michael

Ranzenhofer. See New York State Parole Board: Failures in Staffing and Performance, Fordham Law

Archive of Scholarship and History (2018), at 12-22 (available at https;//tinyurl.com/y4yguggh) (detailing
Smith's activity in politics and his atrocious history of documented misconduct). Senator Gallivan chairs

the New York Senate's Crime, Crime and Correction Committee, which is illuminating given

Commissioner Smith's well-documented history of problematic conduct towards parole applicants, and

both Senators ' explicit support of his re-appointment.
Moreover, not only are the appointments purely political; the Board's decision-making is heavily

influenced by politics. In 2019, New York legislators noted that “current law makes the board susceptible
to political pressure to

deny parole to inmates with high profile crimes even if they are thoroughly

rehabilitated with excellent prison records.” See Jarrett Murphy, Advocates Press Albany to Fix New York's
Parole System (Jan. 30, 2019) (available at https://tinyurl.com/rqx623m) (citing a legislative memo
attached to a bill authored by New York State Senator Gustavo Rivera). One former Commissioner,
Thomas Grant, noted that among several other problems with the New York system, Commissioners are

disincentivized from granting parole to people whose release would be newsworthy. See generally Nazgol
Ghandnoosh, The Next Step: Ending Excessive Punishment for Violent Crimes (Apr, 2019) at Section VII
(available at https://tinyurl,com/y3 th4dq8). Grant indicated that, because the system is “broken, terribly

broken,” Commissioners fear voting in favor of release in cases that attract media attention. Id. Along the
same lines, a former chairman of the Board, Robert Dennison, has explicitly noted the power politics and

media have over the Board. See id. According to Dennison, “if you let someone out and it's going to draw
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media attention, you're not going to be re-appointed/’ Id.; see also Benson v. Stanford, No. 978/2019,

Decision, Order, and Judgment (Dutchess Cty. Apr. 27, 2020) (recounting Board of Parole ’s decision to
rescind its decision to release petitioner “after the Board belatedly received correspondence from the
victim’s family, the Albany County District Attorney, and the sentencing court that objected to Petitioner’s

release”).
Thus, in the first instance, Commissioners have no special expertise that would enable them to

draw factual conclusions concerning whether a potential parolee is truly rehabilitated, whether he poses a
danger to society, or whether supposed “lack of emotion,” as “observed by [ the] panel” during the

interview, is of any import whatsoever. Exhibit 2 at 44. They are guided by politics, not by expertise.
(Indeed, the Board’s ongoing refusal to credit the expert opinion concerning Mr.

’ s obvious

rehabilitation, which was presented in a detailed report from a forensic psychologist, directly underscores
the political nature of their decision-making.) To wit, Mr.

has been unable to find any

requirement that, before appointment, Commissioners be educated— or, post-appointment, that they receive
training— about key advancements in modem science that bear upon the parole inquiry, such as the lesser
criminal culpability of juvenile offenders, the phenomenon whereby offenders “age out” of crime, the

correlation between poverty, abuse, and crime, etcetera. See Exhibits 8, 9.
When these political pressures and lack of expertise are considered alongside Exhibit 17, the

import is obvious. Senator Pamela Helming has built her Tough on crime’ political career on the premise
that New York should eradicate parole for violent offenders because “parolees with violent histories could

be dangerous.” See Let ’s Fight For and Stand With Our Crime Victims (May 7, 2019) (available at
https://tinyurl.com/y2ijlv7p); see also Sen. Helming Urges Governor to Join Fight to Deny Parole for
Teen’s Killers (July 3, 2019) (available at https://tinyurl.com/y2uox4 qe),21 The fact that Senator Helming

21

The source states: “Earlier this year, Senator Helming joined her Senate Republican colleagues in advocating for
[which includes ]: Requiring the Parole Board to consider all comments and
the Victims Justice Agenda
testimony made in a parole hearing when coming to a decision; Requiring the Parole Board to review all relevant
victim impact statements prior to the conduct of a parole hearing; Allowing any person the right to submit a
written statement in support of or in opposition to the granting of parole; Requiring the unanimous consent of the
Parole Board to release an inmate on parole; Increasing the time between parole hearings for violent felony
offenses from two years to five years,”

...
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has taken the time to draft and submit a letter in opposition to Mr.

the Board a clear message; If Commissioners vote to release Mr.

's release, see Exhibit 17, sends

, they will be making an enemy

of Senator Helming, which will hurt their chances of reappointment to the Board in the future. Thus, the

Commissioners have overwhelming incentive not to release Mr.

, and the Senator 's letter clearly

demonstrates that denial at the de novo interview was a foregone conclusion.

.

II

THE DECISION IS SUBJECT TO REVERSAL BECAUSE IT IS CONCLUSORY AND
EVADES JUDICIAL REVIEW

Although deference is granted to decisions made by the Board of Parole, this deference is not

absolute. See Exec, L, § 259-i(2)(a); Rabenbauer v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr, & Cmty. Supervision,
995 N.Y.S,2d 490, 493 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. 2014) (“[W]hile a parole board enjoys a significant level of

discretion, the discretion is not unlimitedf .]”). Pursuant to Executive Law Section 259 -i, when an individual
is denied parole release, “the inmate shall be informed in writing ... of the factors and reasons for such
denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms.” Exec. L. § 259i(2)(c)(A); see also 9 NYCRR § 8002.3. This statutory requirement enables intelligent judicial review, see,

..

..

.

e,g > Mayfield v, Evans, 938 N Y S,2d 290, 299 (N Y App, Div 2012) (“[T]he absence of a detailed

decision inappropriately foreclosed the possibility of intelligent reviewf ]”), because without an articulation
of the Board's reasons for its decision, a court 's “authority to review in the proper circumstances is

thwarted entirely,” Matter of West v. New YorkStateBd, of Parole, No. 3069 - 13, 2013 WL 5657701, at *2

..

. .

.

.

.

.

(N Y Sup Ct Albany Cty Sept 24, 2013); see also Bruetsch v New York State Dep 7 of Corr & Cmty

.

Supervision, No. 0230-14, 2014 WL 1910238 at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. May 11, 2014) (finding

that the Board's bare-bones conclusion “left [ the court ] with no ability to evaluate why the [B]oard made
[its ] conclusory and vague statement.”).

It is “unacceptable, under the law, for [ the Board] to have simply restated the usual and predictable

language contained in so many parole release denial decisions, with no specificity or other explanation to
justify parole denial,” Bruetsch, 2014 WL 1910238 at * 5; see also Rodriguez v. New York State Bd. of

Parole, No. 8670/2015, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5111, at *20 (Sup, Ct. Orange Cty. Feb, 25, 2016) (“The
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Board's failure to provide detailed, non-conclusory reasons for its denials of release cannot continue.”).

Likewise, “boilerplate” decisions are unacceptable. See, e.g., West, 2013 WL 5657701 at * 3 (holding that
the Board's “boilerplate decision” was “utterly inadequate,” and “failed to provide a basis upon which the
Court could review the Board's decision”). For instance, in Morris v. New York State Department of
Corrections, the Supreme Court, Columbia County concluded that the Board's “passing mention” of a

prisoner's institutional accomplishments and its “conclusory statement that ‘required statutory factors have

been considered, including your risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts, and your needs for successful
community reintegration,' were woefully inadequate ... to demonstrate that the Board weighed or fairly

considered the required statutory factors.” 963 N.Y.S.2d 852, 858 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cty. 2013).
Moreover, the Board's “mere recitation of the materials it purportedly considered that were favorable to

Petitioner [] providefd] no assurance whatsoever ... that the Board indeed fairly considered such materials,

particularly since the only reason articulated therefor was petitioner 's crime.” Id, at 859; see also Bruetsch,
2014 WL 1910238 at *4-5 (finding “unacceptable, under the law[,]” the Board's “conclusory decision” that

did not provide any details or specific explanation as to why the seriousness of the offense outweighed the

other factors that the Board found were positive and discussed “in a very perfunctory manner”).
As discussed in greater detail below, when the Board departs from COMPAS, it must articulate its

reasoning. No such articulation is present in the Decision. Likewise, in the Decision, the Board made a

number of factual findings that directly contradict the record—also discussed below—but nonetheless

failed to articulate the reasoning underlying the contradictory conclusions. The Board also cited to
supposed opposition (“community opposition” and “official opposition”) to Mr.

's release without

detailing the contents of that alleged opposition or explaining how it weighed against the overwhelming

factors favoring release. See infra. The Decision is thus conclusory and evades judicial review, and Mr,
should be granted the relief sought herein.
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THE DECISION IS SUBJECT TO REVERSAL BECAUSE IT IS PREDICATED UPON
TWO FACTUALLY INCORRECT ASSERTIONS
In the Decision, the Board made two factually incorrect assertions, either of which alone would

.

.

’s supposed lack of emotion22 was “noted by

warrant reversal First, the Board declared that Mr

[his ] sentencing judge thirty years ago.” Exhibit 22 at 2. That is factually incorrect. At Mr.

sentencing, it was the prosecutor who commented on Mr.

.

. Furthermore, Mr.

at 3 The judge made no such statement

’s alleged lack of emotion. Exhibit 14
’s defense attorney took specific issue

lacked emotion and stated, on the record, that

with the prosecutor ’s allegation that Mr,
everything Mr.

’s

had and had not said since his arrest was on the advice of counsel Id, at 6-7,

Yet even if the Board purports to rely on the observation that Mr.

lacks emotion or

presents as “clinical” as grounds for denial, that conclusion is directly contradicted by facts in the record.
Not only has a trained forensic psychologist determined that Mr.

is remorseful and rehabilitated,

.

see Exhibit 5, but in fact, a psychologist who works for the Department of Corrections evaluated Mr

shortly after this hearing and reached the same conclusions. See Exhibit 13. And Mr.

’s

numerous statements of remorse speak for themselves, Jennings v, Stanford, No. 2020-51294, Decision &

Order (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Sept. 17, 2020), is instructive. There, the court held that:
[Although Respondent argues that the Board may consider an inmate’s
limited expression of remorse and a lack of insight, the record here does not
support the Board’s finding that Petitioner's remorse was ‘shallow.’ The
Court notes that in his final statement to the Board . ,, Petitioner states: T
would like to say, as Eve said in the past, thatI’m sorry for what happened
and I had no right to take anyone's life and it was wrong for me to do
something like that.Iwant to apologize to the family as well asI’ ve done in
the past and to my family as well,Inot only hurt their family butIhurt mine
as well soIwant to sayI’m sorry to everyone, and ifI’m released, something
like that will never happen again andIwould lead a good, clean life and stay
out of trouble.’

Moreover, Petitioner ’s personal statement letter is contained in the record
and is specifically acknowledged by the Board during the interview. That
letter goes into detail regarding the remorse that he feels as a result of his

22

.

To the extent that the Board claims to have relied on its supposed observation In addition, Mr
respectfully asserts and preserves for appeal the argument that the Decision is subject to reversal because this
conclusion is belied by the facts in the record

.
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actions, which is contrary to the Board's assertion that his remorse was
shallow.

Id, at 6-7, In a footnote, the Jennings court added, “The Board appears to focus on Petitioner's statements
during his sentencing wherein he denied killing his victim and that Petitioner maintained his innocence

during the ‘majority' of his incarceration. However, the record is clear that Petitioner has acknowledged his
guilt in both of his appearances before the Parole Board.” Id, at 7. Thus, even apart from the blatant factual

.

error by the Board, the supposed finding that Mr

lacks emotion is undermined by the record and

thus grounds for reversal. See also Bottom v. Stanford, No, E2020 -745 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. Aug 10,
2020) (granting a new hearing where Board irrationally deemed petitioner to be lacking in remorse).

Moreover, the Decision contains a second factually incorrect statement by the Board. In the

Decision, the Board wrote, “[rjecords indicate you had made several calls in an effort to find a female who
would come meet you.” Exhibit 22 at 1. This statement is also explicitly false. The only person Mr.

called on the day of the crime he committed was the female victim. Mr.

did not make

any other phone calls on the date of his crime, and no such allegation was ever made during his trial,

sentencing, or otherwise.
The Board's specious findings, utterly belied by the record, are plainly erroneous and warrant

reversal. See Riverav. Stanford, No, 50638/ 17, 2019 WL 2030503, at *2 (2dDep't 2019) (Board's finding
that release was not compatible with the welfare of society based upon prison disciplinary record was
without support in the record); Coleman v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision 157 A.D.3 d
672, 673 (2d Dep ' t 2018) (“Contrary to the Parole Board's determination that the petitioner ‘distancefd]'
himself from the crime, the record demonstrates that the petitioner took full responsibility for his

actions...”). Indeed, given that both of these errors are mere recitations from previous parole denial
decisions, they demonstrate that the Board failed to actually review the materials in the record before

concluding that denial was appropriate. See Exhibit 3 at 24:22-24 (“Information in the file indicates you
called several people the day you were able to get the victim to meet you.”). Clearly, the panel only
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reviewed previous denials — not the full record—and regurgitated incorrect information. The Decision is
thus subject to reversal.

.

IV

THE DECISION IS SUBJECT TO REVERSAL BECAUSE THE CONCLUSION THAT
MR.
IS NOT REHABILITATED IS CONTRADICTED BY THE FACTS

.

In denying Mr

parole for the seventh time, the Board has, in effect, decided that he “is

.” Matter of Coaxum v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 827 N.Y.S.2d

not rehabilitated and ready for release

489, 494 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2006); see also Exhibit 2 at 44:8-9 (“[ W ] e are certain that you have aged but

less so that you have rehabilitated.”). Under New York law, such a conclusion is arbitrary and subject to

reversal unless it is supported by a factual finding. Because there is no factual basis to conclude that Mr.
is not rehabilitated or that he is unprepared for release—in fact, there is overwhelming evidence
to the contrary, as

.

V

discussed below—the Decision must be reversed.

THE DECISION IS SUBJECT TO REVERSAL BECAUSE THE BOARD FAILED TO
ABIDE BY ITS STATUTORY MANDATE

New York law requires that Commissioners consider specific enumerated factors when

determining whether to grant or deny parole release. Exec L. § 259-i(2)(c)(A). The factors are: ( 1) whether,
if released, the inmate “will live and remain at liberty without violating the law”; (2) whether the inmate's

release will be “incompatible with the welfare of society”; and (3) whether release “will not so deprecate
the seriousness of the crime so as to undermine respect for the law.” Exec L. § 259-i(2)(c)(A). New York

law also requires that the Commissioners consider:
(i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interactions with staff and inmates; , , , (iii) release plans including community
resources, employment, education and training and support services available to the
inmate; . ,, (v) any current or prior statement made to the board by the crime victim
or the victim's representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or
physically incapacitated;,,, (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration
to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing
court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence probation
report as well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities
following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the
nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement.

Id, Because the Board failed to comply with this law, the Decision is subject to reversal.
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.

The Board Improperly Weighed a Non-Statutory Factor That Counsels in Favor of
Release as A Factor Against Release*

A

.

In the Decision, the Board failed to properly weigh the statutory factors Instead, it relied on factors
not listed in the statute, and cited contrived reasoning belied by the facts as the basis

factor was Mr.

for denial. One such

’s supposed over-preparedness for the interview. The Board wrote:

While your documents are in order and your presentation was polished, this panel is
concerned about what comes across as a lack of emotion on your part, noted by your
sentencingjudge thirty years ago and observed by this panel today. Your presentation
and statements seem clinical and well thought out rather than from the heart
demonstrating a recovery from the rage you must have had[.]

Exhibit 2 at 44:1-7, In two sentences, the Board thus acknowledged and then admonished Mr.

for

having “well thought out” answers to their questions. Obviously, this is nonsensical. Rather than crediting
Mr.

for his insight and honesty, the Commissioners turned the fact that he had prepared for the

interview—which he did not only so that he could be his own best advocate, but out of respect for the
forum—against him, and penalized him for having well-reasoned answers to their questions.
As already noted, this was Mr.

>

.

s seventh appearance before the Board Meaning, he has

attended enough previous parole interviews to know what questions would likely be asked. Further —as the

Commissioners were inexplicably inquisitive about during the interview, see Exhibit 2, 3:19-4:10—Mr.

is represented by counsel. To suggest that it is somehow nefarious that he was prepared for the

questions that would be asked during the interview is nothing short of absurd. Moreover, as the panel was
well-aware (and in fact noted specifically), Mr.

has affirmatively sought to educate himself while

incarcerated and has successfully earned a degree from Bard College, For instance, a supporter wrote of
Mr. CampelTs participation in the Bard Prison Initiative program:
His reflections on the paper he was writing about religious volunteering illustrated
empathy towards others and an openness to learning new perspectives. His intellectual
curiosity was rooted in pursuit of moral learning, as evidenced by the way he
approached analyzing the reasons and purposes of people who volunteer for religious
reasons.

Exhibit 15 at 5. In other words, it is no surprise that Mr.
is ridiculous for the Board to criticize Mr.

.

can communicate effectively Really, it

for sounding “clinical” when answering their
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questions; he is an educated, middle-aged man, not the fourteen-year-old child who committed the
underlying offense. His language choices reflect his maturation and growth in the thirty-plus years since the

initial offense.
By turning his thoughtfulness into a negative factor, the Board's proposition leaves Mr.

with an impossible choice: reflect, prepare, and have his presentation labeled as too “well thought out” (and

thus be denied parole), or be accused of having “limited insight” into his actions and rehabilitation (and
thus be denied parole). See Exhibit l.23 And even aside from the inherent injustice of this Hobson's choice,
the Board's reliance on a non-statutory factor—Mr.

's supposed over-preparedness—warrants

reversal. By stepping outside of the statutorily enumerated factors, the Board violated its State-given
mandate. “It is well established that [ the Board] may not rely upon factors outside the scope of Executive
Law § 259-i in making decisions concerning parole release and is not permitted to rely upon factors outside

ofthat statute.” Matter of Applewhite, 167 A.D.3 d 1380, 1383 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (Garry, J., dissenting)
(citing King v, New York State Div, of Parole, 83 N,Y,2d 788, 790; Matter

of Duffy v. New York State Dep’t

of Corr. & Community Supervision, 132 A.D.3 d 1207, 1209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)) (other citations
omitted).
Yet even assuming, arguendo, that the Board's consideration of this non-statutory factor was

permissible (it was not), the conclusion still warrants reversal because it is directly contradicted by the facts
in the record. The Decision's conclusion about Mr.

' s supposed “clinical” attitude is directly at

odds with the forensic psychological evaluation of Mr.

, which was part of Mr.

's parole

application. See Exhibit 5, Dr. Paradis, a licensed forensic psychologist, concluded the following about Mr.

Mr.
's current psychological functioning and personality make-up are
dramatically different from when he was fourteen. The passage of time has played a
factor in his improvement—he grew up. In addition, he has had a very positive
response to the prison programs and treatments. He has developed insight about his
personality make-up and developed the ability to modulate strong emotions.

23

After Mr,
’s 2019 interview, the Board's decision referenced his “limited insight” as a reason for his
parole release denial. Exhibit 1, That decision was vacated by Appeals Unit, Exhibit 11,
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Id. at 11. The Board's conclusion—that, because Mr.

's presentation was “polished” and Mr.

's statements were “well thought out,” Mr.

obviously does not have “from the heart”

emotion about his offense, Exhibit 22 at 2—is directly contradicted by the findings of a professional

forensic psychologist.24 As Dr. Paradis indicates in her report, Mr.

.

to heart in his efforts to rehabilitate To penalize him for

has taken prison programming

learning and growing from programming that is

specifically designed to teach and foster self-reflection is not only illogical; it's counterproductive to the
purpose of the parole inquiry.

Indeed, an outpatient clinical record report written by Kristie Sneckenberg, a DOCCS staff

psychologist, shortly after the interview corroborates this point. In her report, Ms. Sneckenberg wrote, “it
[is ] clear that Mr.

has strong feelings in regards to his [ offense] and it appears that his choice of

words are a defense mechanism to help him cope with his behaviors as an adolescent and protect himself
emotionally in front of people he is not familiar with.” Exhibit 13 at 2, Likewise, a previous panel of the

Board acknowledged the sincerity of Mr,

's regret and remorse for his crime, stating that “[ You]

[w]rote a nice letter of remorse.Iknow that you're remorseful.I'm sure you are.” Exhibit 3 at 18:11- 12.

Thus, a plethora of evidence in the record demonstrates that Mr,

feels genuine, from-the-

heart remorse for his crime, and that he was neither over-prepared for the interview, nor overly clinical in
his presentation. The panel's conclusion to the contrary is (a) not appropriately considered under the

. The Decision is therefore subject to reversal.

statute, and (b) not factually accurate

B*

The Decision Relies on “Community Opposition,” a Non-Statutory Factor *

Community opposition is not a factor bearing upon parole release determinations. “It is well

established that [ the Board] may not rely upon factors outside the scope of Executive Law § 259-iin
making decisions concerning parole release and is not permitted to rely upon factors outside of that
statuteMatter of Applewhite, 167 A.D.3 d 1380, 1383 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (Garry, J., dissenting) ( citing

24

.
’s choice of wonl md demeanor during the interview, as reflected in the transcript,
repeatedly referred to his crime in negative, emotional terms,
contradict the Board’s conclusion, Mr,
calling it “horrible,” among other things, and he explicitly stated that justice could never truly be served for his
crime. See Exhibit 2.

In addition, Mr

^
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King, 632 N.E.2d at 1277; Matter of Duffy v. New York State Dep t of Corr. & Community Supervision,
9

132 A.D.3 d 1207, 1209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)) (other citations omitted). While the Board is required by
statute to

consider statements from crime victims or their representatives, Duffy , 132 A.D.3 d at 1208, the

Board is not permitted to consider factors not contained in the statute—namely, statements of, or opposition

from, the general community and other non-victims or representatives of non-victims, “Under well-

established rules of statutory construction, the Legislature’s failure to include materials provided by
community members among the factors to be considered by respondent must be understood to reveal that
the exclusion was intentional /’ Matter

of Applewhite, 167 AD.3d at 1385 (internal citations omitted).

In King, the Court of Appeals of New York held that a juvenile offender was “not afforded a proper

[parole] hearing because one of the Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of the applicable
statute, including penal philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death

penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to society if those sentences are not in

place,” 83 N.Y.2d at 791. The Court declared that consideration of those types of factors is not authorized

by Executive Law § 259-i,
The impropriety of including community opposition in parole decision-making is not a new

principle. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner of N. Y.S. Dep t of Correctional Serv., 70 A.D.2d 1039, 1040
9

(N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (holding that, where the District Attorney provided a letter “expressing community

opposition to petitioner’s release,” the “respondents should not have considered the letter') (emphasis
added); Howland v. Henderson, 54 A.D.2d 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (“We find that the reasons given for
denial of parole, other than adverse community reaction[,] were meaningful and a fair statement of a

reasonable basis for denial of relator ’s release on parole[,]”) (emphasis added). The only factors that the
New York statute permits the Parole Board to consider are those which are clearly enumerated in Executive
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Law § 259-i. Nonetheless, in the Decision, the Board not only unlawfully considered community

opposition, but relied upon it as grounds for the denial of parole release.25 See Exhibit 22.

. Stanford, the court found that the panel erred when it relied on community opposition

In Ramirez v

when denying the petitioner parole. Specifically, the court noted;
The board's decision was affected by an error of law as it considered at least one factor
authorized under Executive Law §259-i. The commissioners stated both during
the hearing and in their written decision that there was consistent community
opposition to petitioner’s release. Executive Law §259-i does not permit the board to
consider its penal philosophy in deciding whether parole release is warranted. To the
extent that the board’s determination here is based upon letters of community
opposition, such letters object to release based upon penal philosophy. As members
of the parole board are not permitted to apply their own penal philosophy in
determining whether release is appropriate, it necessarily follows that they may not
deny parole release based upon letters from third parties expressing their penal

not

philosophies.

Ramirez v. Stanford, No, 1928/2016 at *3 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty, Feb, 7, 2017). In Mr,

's case,

the panel noted community opposition both in the interview, see Exhibit 2 at 31:24-25, and in the Decision,
Exhibit 22 at 3, This presents a multitude of problems, any one of which is grounds for reversal.
First, community opposition cannot be considered, let alone form the basis for denial, as it does
here. Thus, the Decision is subject to reversal.
Second, as Mr.

noted in his interview, “I don't plan on returning to the community which

.

.

I originally grew up in Iplan on going to [New York City]." Exhibit 2 at 32:1-2 Based on the documents

turned over by DOCCS (which are heavily and improperly redacted), the people who are opposed to Mr.
's release seem to be constituents of Senator Helming's (meaning, residents of communities in

Upstate New York) and a member of the small town where this crime took place. See Exhibits 17, 18. Yet

there is no indication in the record that the community he intends to join—the New York City
community— objects to his release. Indeed, Mr,

has extensive support in New York City, as

demonstrated by his housing and employment plans. See generally Exhibit 15. Mr.

25

therefore

Of note, community support for the offender is expressly included within the mandate of Executive Law § 259i(2)(c)(A)(iii), The Board may consider the offender’s “release plans [,] including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services ” Id, Relatives, friends, clergy, and community
members who support the offender’s release fall within the meaning of community resources.

.
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opposition to his release from people who will not be his neighbors is irrelevant and should

.

never have been considered, and the Decision is subject to reversal on these grounds

Third, even if community opposition existed and were appropriate for consideration by the Board,

there are numerous letters of support in the record, and statements in support of parole are appropriately

considered. See supra n,25. Thus, even if the Board were permitted to consider community opposition as a
factor weighing against release, community support would weigh in favor of release, and the result would

be nil; each factor would serve to balance out the other. Thus, the Decision is improper and subject to
reversal.

a

The Decision Relies On “Official Opposition,” A Non-Statutory Factor.

Though it does not define the term “official opposition”—or point to any specific parts of the

parole file that purport to be that opposition—the Decision states, “[ t]he Panel notes official opposition to

.

your release[.]” Exhibit 22 at 2 -3 For the reasons stated above, consideration of “official opposition” is

inappropriate as a non-statutory factor. Based on that fact alone, the panel's Decision should be reversed.

Furthermore, supposed “official opposition” is improper as a factor for consideration because New
York courts have unequivocally held that material conveying “penal philosophy” may not be considered,

. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 433 (1st Dept 1993), offd, 83 N.Y.2d 788

see King v

(1994). And even if it were proper for consideration, if the “opposition” material is years old, it is “stale,”

and it constitutes “irrationality bordering on impropriety” to rely upon it as a basis for denying parole. See
Hopps v. N. Y. State Bd. of Parole, Decision and Order Index No. 2553 / 18 (Sup. Ct. Orange Cty. 2018)
(“[T]he only evidence in the record or otherwise submitted to the Court that might be argued to constitute
[ official opposition] are statements made by the victim's sister at the time of sentencing (some 25 years

ago), and documents generated around the same time[.] [T]he Court finds no even relatively current

information that would support a finding that there was ‘official opposition and significant and persuasive

community opposition on file ' . . . . [I] t is irrationality bordering on impropriety for the Board to deny

parole based on statements about the Petitioner 's suitability for release at or around the time of the
underlying offense, some 25 years ago.”). Here, neither the transcript of the interview nor the Decision
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itself illuminate what “official opposition” the panel was referring to. However, documents disclosed by

.

.

.

DOCCS include two letters from Mr Richard M Healy, the district attorney who prosecuted Mr

's crime. See Exhibit 16. The letters are dated 1999 and 2008, making the most recent letter 12

. . .

.

years old Id Mr Healy is no longer even the District Attorney; Michael D Calarco is the current District

Attorney of Wayne County, and his office has expressed no opposition to Mr.

.

's release Thus,

.

not only are the letters “stale;” they were penned by a man who is no longer a state “official ”

Yet even assuming, arguendo, that the Board could deny release based on “official opposition”—

which it cannot—the Decision must still be vacated because there is “no even relatively current information
that would support a finding that there [is] official opposition” to Mr.

's release. See Hopps,

Decision and Order Index No. 2553 / 18. To the extent these letters underly the Board's statement about
“official opposition,” the Decision must be reversedbecause relying on one 12 -year-old letter and one 21-

.

year-old letter (both from a District Attorney who is no longer in office) is wholly inappropriate And to the

.

extent the Decision did not rely on Mr Healy 's letters, the Decision should be reversedbecause there is no

official opposition to Mr.
VI*

.

's release

THE DECISION FAILS TO EXPLAIN ITS DEPARTURE FROM COMPAS

The Board's decision should be reversed because of its failure to properly consider Mr.

.

.

COMPAS assessment The Board has a duty to explain how releasing Mr

's

—a model inmate who

has spent more than 30 years in prison without ever committing an act of violence, who is at low risk for
felony violence and re-arrest—wouldundermine respect for the law. Because the Decision fails to explain

the departure from COMPAS, it must be reversed.
The Board's own regulations are clear: if, in denying release, “the Board departs from the

Department Risk and Needs Assessment 's scores, the Board shall specify any scale within the Department
Risk and Needs Assessment from which it departed and provide individualized reason for such departure.”
9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a) (emphasis added). Even if the Board makes no comments about an applicant 's

ability to live at liberty without violating the law, the Board is still required to identify the scale from which

it departed from the COMPAS assessment and provide an individualized reason for the departure. Voii v.
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Stanford, No. 50485 /2020 at * 6 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. May 13, 2020). The Board's failure to offer
individualized reasons for departing from COMPAS constitutes error warranting reversal. Jennings v.

Stanford, No. 2020-51294, Decision & Order (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Sept. 17, 2020) 26; Robinson v.
Stanford, No. 2392/2018 at * 2 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Mar. 13, 2019) (finding that the Parole Board's
determination denying parole release was affected by an error of law where “the Board's conclusory
statement that it considered statutory factors, including petitioner 's risk to the community, rehabilitation

efforts and need for successful community re-entry in finding that discretionary release would not be

compatible with the welfare of society failfed] to meet [ the requirement of an individualized reason for
departing from COMPAS]."); see also Comfort v. New York State Bd. of Parole, No. 1445 /2018, at *5
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Dec. 21, 2018) (finding that the Board did not comply with § 8002.2(a) when it

concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the petitioner would not live and remain at liberty

without violating the law but failed to explain its departure from the lowest possible COMPAS risk score);
Coleman, 157 A.D.3 d at 673 (reversing denial of Art, 78 petition because “the petitioner,,.was assessed
Tow ' for all risk factors on his COMPAS,,. risk assessment. Thus, a review of the record demonstrates that

in light of all the factors, notwithstanding the seriousness of the underlying offense, the Parole Board's
‘determination to deny the petitioner release on parole evinced irrationality bordering on impropriety.'”);

Rabenbauer v. New York State Dep 7 of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 24347 at * 1 (Sup.
Ct. Sullivan Cty. Nov 12, 2014) (ordering de novo interview because “the Parole Board ignored the
[COMPAS] risk assessment and made only superficial inquiry into the statutory factors in Executive Law §

259- i(2)(c)(A)).

26

The Jennings court held: “Therefore, after reviewing the Decision within the context of the Interview Transcript,
the Court finds that although the Board indicates that it chose to depart from COMPAS, it does not identify the
scale from which it departed, nor does it articulate an individualized reason for such departure, in contravention
of 9 N Y.C.R R, 98002.2(a). Instead, the Board indicates, generically, that it is departing from COMPAS and
identifies that reason for the departure is the shallowness of his remorse. Notably, the COMPAS Risk
Assessment contains twelve categories, none of which involve an offender's lack of remorse Thus, the purported
"individualized’ reason provided by the Board for the departure is unrelated to any scale contained in the
COMPAS Assessment ,... As the evidence before this Court demonstrates that the Parole Board herein did not
comply with the requirements of 9 N Y C.R R, 98002.2(a), judicial intervention is warranted because this
departure from the regulation evinces irrationality bordering on impropriety ” (citations omitted).

.

.

.

. . .

.
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New York State implemented COMPAS to provide greater transparency, consistency, and

objectivity to the Board's decisions. The Board adopted COMPAS to comply with its statutory mandate to
“establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law. Such written

procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing

before the board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state

board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision,” N.Y. Exec. Law §
259(c)(4). COMPAS is intended to serve as an empirically validated “research based clinical assessment”
to assess an incarcerated person's risks

and needs by “gathering quality and consistent information to

.

support decisions about supervision, treatment, and other interventions »27

Here, the Board acknowledged during the interview that “[Mr.

's ] COMPAS Risk

Assessment reflects low risk low need scores. That 's a favorable risk assessment.” Exhibit 2 at 28; 18- 19.
In the Decision, the Board further acknowledged “[y] our COMPAS Risk Assessment reflects low risk and

low need scores.” Exhibit 22 at 2. In spite of these acknowledgements, the Board failed to offer any

individualized reason why it departed from COMPAS, Undoubtedly, this is because there is no logical
reason, as Mr.

27

28

is clearly low risk,28 Nonetheless, without an explanation, the Board's Decision

.

DOCCS, Directive No. 8500: COMPAS Assessment/Case Plan, Nov 19, 2015 (available at
https://doccs nv gov/system / files/documents/2020/Q2/85 QQ pdf).
Mr.
notes for the Court’s reference that in the eighth parole denial decision from March 22, 2021, the
Board tried to circumvent the requirement that it explain any departure from COMPAS by purporting not to be
departing from the low score See Exhibit 24 at 26:20-23 (“Ido have your COMPAS, your COMPAS indicates
that your [sic ] low risk for felony violence, arrest and absconding, you're low for criminal involvement, history
of violence, and prison misconduct,”) and 38:22- 39:2 (declaring in the decision that “[consideration was also
given to your sentencing minutes, PSI, Case Plan, and COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment, COMPAS
indicates that you are at low risk for felony violence, arrest, and absconding In denying your release, the Panel
does not depart from scores in COMPAS but nonetheless is persuaded against release at this time ”). Obviously,
this is nothing more than an attempt by the Board to sidestep the legal requirement that it articulate intelligible
reasons for departing from COMPA because Commissioners understand that there is no articulable and
s across the board low risk COMPAS scores See, e g,, Benson v
reasonable basis to depart from Mr,
,
Judgment
,
,
Decision
(Dutchess Cty Apr, 27, 2020) (“Respondents argue that
/
No
2019
,
Orncr
978
m
Stanford
the Board's conclusion that Petitioner would "not live and remain at liberty without again violating the law’ is not
a departure from his low COMP AS scores on the risk of re- offense scale. Respondents assert that while
COMPAS assesses an individual's risks relative to other inmates and parolees, the Board evaluates a parole
candidate's risk of re offending against the risk of criminality posed by all members of the general public. This
argument is unpersuasive. Under Respondents' formulation, a parole candidate's risk of re offending (even if
low, as here) will invariably compare unfavorably with the risk of re offending posed by members of the general
public This argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would render the COMPAS assessment essentially

. .

.

.

.

^

.

^

- -

-

-

-

.
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failed to meet its own regulation, § 8002.2(a), and the decision must be reversed.29
VII*

THE DECISION IS BASED SOLELY ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE UNDERLYING
OFFENSE

Mr.

has been a model and conscientious inmate for more than thirty years. He recognizes

the awfulness of his crime, and has spent a significant amount of time reflecting on his remorse. As he
noted at the interview, “Iknow what Eve taken from the community, from a family, and Fm sorry. There’ s

nothingIwouldn’t do to make this right. Nothing.” Exhibit 2 at 39;15 -17. Yet he can never bring back the

lives he took. There is simply nothing Mr.

can do to change the facts of his crime, or the

magnitude of the loss he inflicted. And so, he has done the only thing he could do: he availed himself of
every opportunity to grow, mature, and change as a person, learning to manage his emotions, overcome his

disabilities, and educate himself. He has opted to wake up each day and strive to be a better person than he

.

was the day before Indeed, the panel recognized as much; Commissioner Agostini called his education a

“great accomplishment,” Exhibit 2 at 25:24, noted his “good disciplinary record” id. at 28; 9 -10), his
“favorable risk assessment,” id. at 28:18- 19, and stated “[i] t’s good that you earned [your Limited Credit
Time Allowances],” id. at 33:5 - 14, Commissioner Agostini further added that Mr.

had “a lot of

good material in the record.” Id. at 33: 14- 15,

Nonetheless, the panel still concluded that Mr.

.

’s release would “deprecate [his] offense

.

so as to undermine respect for the law ” Exhibit 22 at 3 If after thirty years of tremendous growth,

reflection, and rehabilitation, Mr.

’s release would undermine respect for the law because his

offense was simply too serious, there is a genuine question of whether the Board will ever find Mr.

fit for release. What he can change he has changed. He has committed himself to addressing the

psychological, social, and emotional factors underlying his crime, and dedicated himself to a productive,

irrelevant to the Board's decision making process and runs afoul of the plain language of the regulation. Based
upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the Board’s determination that Petitioner would not live and remain at
liberty without violating the law is a departure from a scale within his COMP AS assessment Thus, 9 NYCRR
8002.2(a) required the Board to specify the scale from which it departed and provide an individualized reason
for such departure,”),
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court disagrees that the Board had an obligation to explain its departure from
COMPAS, the Board’s failure to explain the departure is further evidence that the Decision is conclusory and

-

.

29

evades judicial review.

35
50 of 84

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

.

non-violent, loving life He has found God, and he has lived every day in accordance with the sincerity of

the remorse and regret he feels for his actions as a child. What he cannot change is the fact that he took two

innocent lives—no matter how much he wishes he could.

.

In making its decision that Mr

's release would so deprecate the seriousness of the crime

so as to undermine respect for the law, the Board impermissibly relied on just a single factor to justify the

denial: the seriousness of the crime. Once the unlawful and erroneous considerations are rightfully

discarded as improper for the reasons explained above, there is no other rationale for denying release,30 Yet
the law is clear. The Board may not deny parole based solely on the nature of the offense. Ferrante v.

Stanford, 172 A.D.3d 31, 37 (2d Dep't 2019) (“the Board may not deny an inmate parole based solely on
the seriousness of the offense.”); Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 196 A.D.3 d 22, 27 (1st Dep't
2016) (Holding the Board acted irrationally in focusing exclusively on the seriousness of petitioner 's

conviction and the decedent 's family victim impact statements,,.without giving genuine consideration to

petitioner 's remorse, institutional achievements, release plan, and her lack of any prior criminal history).
See also, Huntley v, Evans, 910 N,Y,S.2d 112 (2d Dep't 2010) (“where the Parole Board denies release to

parole solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense,,, it acts irrationally.”); Jennings v, Stanford,
No. 2020-51294 (overturning denial of parole release because, inter alia, Board's conclusion that

petitioner 's remorse was “shallow” was merely an attempt to deny release based on the seriousness of the

crime). “The legislative intent behind the Executive Law for parole board determinations relies on a
forward-looking paradigm, rather than a backward looking approach that focuses on the severity of the

crime,” Miranda v. New York State Bd, of Parole, No, 150995 /2020 at *4 (Sup, Ct. New York Cty. Oct. 13,
2020) (citing Platt v. New York State Bd, of Parole, 47 Misc 3 d 1059, 1062 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty, 2015).

30

Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court were to deem it lawful for the Board to rely on Mr,
’s
supposed lack of emotion and opposition to his release—both non- statutory factors —those factoi re
inextricably entwined with the seriousness of the offense. Stated differently, given that Mr,
has never
committed another act of violence since commission of the crime, community and “official” opposition from the
prosecuting attorney can ow /M jased on the seriousness of the underlying offense. Likewise, the Board’s
subjective opinion of Mr
H’s capacity for emoting is, on its face, tied to the Commissioner’s mistaken
belief that the sentencing judge found him lacking in emotion given the severity of the crime Thus, both factors
are expressions of the fact that Mr,
’s crime was very serious.

^

^
.^^^^

.
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As noted above, indications that a parole denial was predetermined is ground for a de novo hearing.

See Johnson v. New York State Bd of Parole, 65 A.D.3 d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009); Morris v. New York State
Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc. 3 d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cty. 2013). Here, the Board pre-

determined that the seriousness of the offense should outweigh the overwhelming positive factors that
counsel in favor of release. This doesn’t just indicate that the Decision was a foregone conclusion; it also

bases denial on the single fact Mr,

will never have the ability to change: the severity of his crime.

The Board’s decision should therefore be reversed.

VIII*

rs SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS*

THE DECISION VIOLATES MR*

According to the United States Supreme Court, the Sixth andFourteenth Amendments guarantee
that any fact31 that enhances the penalty to which a criminal defendant may lawfully be sentenced must be

found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,32 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U,S. 466, 490 (2000), This

protection “must be guarded with most jealous circumspection” wherever found, because “the jury right
couldbe lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion.” See id, at n,11 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S, 227, 247-48 (1999)). Moreover, the state may not “hide” a fact that aggravates a

punishment by describing it as a “sentencing factor” rather than an element of an offense that must be
decided by a jury of peers and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.
99, 114- 15 (2013). These principles apply to the aggravation of both minimum and maximum punishment

. See id, at 108; see also Kirklin v. United States, 883 F.3d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v.

terms

Ventura, 742 Fed. App'x, 575, 580 (2d. Cir. 2018) (acknowledging that Apprendi and Alleyne are

controlling precedent); People v, Prindle, 29 N.Y.3 d 463 (N,Y, 2017) (same).
Supreme Court jurisprudence on this principle has, in the past, involved sentencing decisions

following conviction after trial or plea. However, in recent years, courts have extended the principle to

parole decision-making. For instance, recently, the Supreme Court extended Alleyne fs rationale to judicial

determinations on parole violations. See United States v , Raymond, 139 S.Ct. 2369 (2019). A federal
31

32

Any fact other than the fact of a prior conviction, which is not relevant in this case, as Mr,
convictions,
A defendant may also admit to a fact, which also is not relevant in this case.
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District Court in Wisconsin has also endorsed an argument that, just as sentencing judges may not
aggravate statutory penalties based on factual determinations not found by a jury, so too are the

administrative functions of a parole board constrained by the Sixth Amendment. See King v. Landreman,
No. 19-CV-338, Dkt. No. 6 (W.D. Wis. June 24, 2019) (declining to dismiss a Sixth Amendment claim

against the Wisconsin Parole Commission by a class of incarcerated juvenile offenders denied parole

release). This extension of Sixth Amendment protections to the context of parole—particularly with regard
to juvenile offenders like Mr,

is logical and reasonable, as noted by various scholars. See, e,g ,

Kimberly Thomas, Paul Reingold, From Grace to Grids: Rethinking Due Process Protectionfor Parole,
107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213 (2017); Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles:

Eighth Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553 (2015); W. DavidBall,

Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109
COLUM. L. REV, 893 (2009), For the reasons explained below, Mr,

argues that the Decision

.

must be vacated because it violates the Sixth Amendment

.

A

Due Process-Secured Sixth Amendment Protections Apply to Parole Proceedings *

The Sixth Amendment functions to “guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of
rulers.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343
(1769)). In so doing, it demands that “ the truth of every accusation , whether preferred in the shape of an

indictment, information, or appeal, should be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [ the
defendant 's ] equals and neighbors.” Id. (emphasis in original). In other words, the jury, and only the jury,
can find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of all elements of the crime for which he is to

be punished. Id, at 477 (holding that the Due Process Clause “indisputably entitle[s ] a criminal defendant to
4

a jury determination that [he ] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a

reasonable doubt.'”) (quoting United States v , Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)). And it does not matter

whether the factual finding that bears on punishment is technically an “element” of the crime. It is the
consequences of a finding of fact on punishment—not whether it is a statutory element—that triggers Sixth

Amendment safeguards. Id, at 494 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect— does the
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required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury 's guilty

verdict?”). The Supreme Court has “made clear beyond peradventure that ... due process and associated
jury protections extend ... To determinations that go not to a defendant 's guilt or innocence, but simply to
the length of his sentence.'” Id. at 492 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 251
(1998) (Scalia, J,, dissenting)).33

Thus, “[ t]he Sixth Amendment reserves to juries the determination of any fact, other than the fact
of a prior conviction, that increases a criminal defendant 's maximum potential sentence,” Southern Union

. .

..

Co. v U S., 567 U S 343, 346 (2012). Indeed, “[ w]hen a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed

punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be

submitted to the jury.” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 144- 15. And “aggravation” is not limited to an increase in the
maximum sentence: “Facts increasing the legally prescribed [sentencing] floor aggravate the punishment”

. Id. at 113,

as well, such that those facts also must be found by a jury to be true beyond a reasonable doubt

116 (emphasis in original).

“Together with the right to vote, those who wrote our Constitution considered the right to trial by
jury ‘the heart and lungs, the mainspring and the center wheel' of our liberties, without which ‘the body
must

die; the watch must run down; the government must become arbitrary.'” Raymond, 139 S.Ct. at 2375

(quoting Letter from Clarendon to W. Pym (Jan. 27, 1766), in 1 Papers of John Adams 169 (R. Taylor ed.

1977)). The state may not circumvent that right. It may not do so with judicial action, see Raymonds 139

. .

.

.

S Ct 2369, with federal statute, see Apprendi, 530 U S, 466, with sentencing guidelines, see Blakely v

Washington, 542 U.S. 496 (2004), or with administrative action. The Sixth Amendment thus applies to

decisions from the Board of Parole.

33

See also Raymond, 139 S.Ct, at 2379 (2019) (“Our precedents, Apprendi, Blakely, and Alleyne included, have
repeatedly rejected efforts to dodge the demands of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by the simple expedient of
relabeling a criminal prosecution a 'sentencing enhancement’,
As this Court has repeatedly explained, any
increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact requires a jury and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt no matter what the government chooses to call the exercise,”) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).

...
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The Decision Relies on Facts Not Found by A Jury.

In the Decision, the Board engaged in the very fact-finding that is prohibited by the Sixth

Amendment. Concerning the jury verdict, Commissioner Agostini asserted during the interview that “Ilook
at it as [ the jury was ]

trying to keep the community safe from you. If you could do this when you were 14

who knows what you could do when you were 15 or something,” Exhibit 2 at 24:1-4, She continued,

“[k]ids get their feelings hurt, they get pissed off at their parents, at other people, they don’t do what you
did, that ’ s not common,” Id, at 24:5 -7. Also during the interview, Commissioner Segarra asked a series of

fact-finding questions about Mr.
how Mr.

’s actions following the crime. She questioned (disbelievingly)

was able to “just snap out of it like that, stop crying;” id, at 36:15- 16, she asked whether

he had “a good [soccer] game” when he next played, id. at 36:20-21, she inquired whether, when assaulting

the teenage victim, “were you aroused, was it pleasurable for you?”; id, at 38:12- 13, and concerning his
decision to leave the scene of the crime, she asked: “When you saw [ the scene ], what did you do? Did you

puke, did you cry, did you try to clean it up, did you spit on the ground? I don’t know, what did you do . . . ,
Did you pray?” Id, at 38:2-4, 6.34
Then, in the Decision, the Board made its own findings of fact about the crime and Mr.

>

s

culpability. It declared that there were “ aggravating factors” to the crime—namely, the fact of two victims,
and the “beyond excessive” nature of the murders—and that, despite a forensic psychological opinion to

the contrary, Mr.

.

may have aged, but he has not “rehabilitated ” Id , at 44:8-9 (emphasis added).

The Board also erroneously proclaimed that, “[r] ecords indicate that [Mr.

34

.

] had made several calls

Commissioner Segarra’s predisposition against Mr
was also evident when she asked: “The sex crime,
were you aroused, was it pleasurable to you?” Id at 38:12-13 And this question exposes not just th uestioner’s
predisposition against Mr.
but also her ignorance of psychology and criminology, as Mr
account of his crime is fully consistent with scholarly works that examine sexual violence perpetrateaD}^!
enraged” offender. See generally David P Bryden and Maren M Grier, The Search for Rapists ’ “Real”
Motives, 101 J CRIM,L & CRIMINOLOGY 171, 222 (2013) (available at
https://scholarlycommons law,northwestem,edu/jclc/voll 01/issl /5) (“Typically, says Groth, the enraged rapist’s
predominant mood is a combination of resentment, distress, frustration, depression, and anger; the offense itself
is an explosive discharge of pent up fury, in response to some upsetting event , , , , The rape victim is sometimes
the source of his anger, but in other cases, it is another person or situation— for example, his parents or his wife,
losing his job or being fired, or debts The rape victim is then simply a convenient object for the rapist’s
displaced rage,”).

.

.

.

.

.

.^

.

.

-

.
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in an effort to find a female who would come meet [him];” id. at 42:16- 17, and that “this Panel is

concerned about what comes across as a lack of emotion on your part, noted by your sentencing judge 30

.

.

.

years ago /’ Id at 44:2-4 Thus, they concluded, releasing Mr

would “still tend to deprecate [his]

offense so as to undermine respect for the law /’ Id. (emphasis added).
As the Honorable Justice Cohen of the Appellate Division, Second Department acknowledged in

did not make phone calls to anyone besides the victim on the day of the

open court in 2019, Mr,

crime. Thus, not only is fact finding the province of the jury and not the Board, but this purported fact is
blatantly false and belied by the record. Likewise, the sentencing judge did not conclude that Mr.

lacked emotion. It was the prosecuting attorney who alleged as much, and in response, Mr.

.

attorney clarified that all statements made (and not made) by Mr

based on his instructions as Mr.

’s

following his arrest had been

’s counsel. See Exhibit 14 at 6.35

The jury convicted Mr.

of two counts of murder in the second degree. Meaning, they

determined that he had intentionally caused the deaths of two other people. See McKinney ’s Penal Law §
125,25 (1990), Mr.

.

was neither charged with nor convicted of rape He was not found, by a jury,

.

to have been guilty of leaving the scene of a crime, or of failing to pray over the bodies of his victims The

jurors did not find him guilty of going to a soccer game, of not crying enough after his crime, or of lacking

emotion, nor did they assert that he had to be imprisoned to protect the safety of the community. The jury

did not find that Mr.

was more culpable because he committed murder as a 14-year-old child

instead of as an adult, regardless of whether Commissioner Agostini believes that his youth aggravates,
instead of mitigating his guilt,36 The “truth of [ these] accusation^]” were never “confirmed by the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of [ the defendant’s ] equals and neighbors.” Apprendi, 530 U.S, at 476,

35

.

The exchange at sentencing went as follows Prosecutor: “[ S ]ince the date this crime occurred, this Defendant
has demonstrated no emotion,” Defense Attorney: “What he did or did not do during the trial was based upon my
decision as to whether he should or should not testify What he told or did not tell the Probation Department was
based upon my instructions to him SoIdo not share the belief that he has no feelings about what happened,I
think probably, knowing him, you know, better than anyone in this world, he knows the loss, he feels the pain,
and as much as anyone else, he is also a victim,” Exhibit 14 at 6
is more culpable because he was a juvenile offender runs directly counter to
The suggestion that Mr,
Supreme Court jurisprudence, equivalent New York law, and modem brain science. See, e g,, Beatriz Luna, The

.

36

.

.

.
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The Board has thus unequivocally invaded the province of the jury in order to “aggravatefe],” see
Exhibit 2 at 44, Mr.

>

.

s sentence Indeed, the Board's intention—to extend the sentence beyond

what was imposed—is evinced by its use of the word “still” when declaring that release would undermine

. .

respect for the law Id at 44:15 -17 (“[ T]his panel has determined that your release wouldstill tend to

deprecate your offense so as to undermine respect for the law.”) (emphasis added). For these reasons, the

Decision plainly makes “determinations that go ... to the length of [Mr.

..

’s ] sentence” and thus

..

runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment, Apprendi, 530 U S at 492

a

’s Mandatory Minimum Sentence.

.

The Decision Increases Mr

The Sixth Amendment forbids the Board from making factual findings about the commitment
offense for purposes of increasing the punishment floor for that offense above what was prescribed by the

legislature and imposed by the sentencing judge, “Facts increasing the legally prescribed floor aggravate
the punishment,” so that those facts “must ,.. be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable

doubt,” AUeyne, 570 U,S. at 113, 116 (emphasis in original). A state may not circumvent the protections of
the Sixth Amendment “merely by ‘redefinfing] the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing
them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 (quoting

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 ( 1975)), whether by judge or, as here, by agency officials.
Here, a jury did not find, nor did Mr.

plead guilty to, the facts about his offense that the

Board relies upon to justify his parole denial. That Mr.

was sentenced to an “indeterminate”

.

Relevance of Immaturities in the Juvenile Brain to Culpability and Rehabilitation, 63 Hastings LJ 1469 (2012)
(available at https://repository uchastings edU/hastings_law_ joumal/vol63 /iss6/2) (“Fundamental to culpability
and responsibility is the ability to effectively execute voluntary executive behavior Executive function,
including cognitive control and working memory, has a protracted development with key aspects continuing to
mature through adolescence These limitations in executive control are due in great part to still maturing brain
processes. Gray and white matter changes are still becoming established in adolescence, enhancing efficiency
and the speed of brain processing supporting executive control Dopamine, a neurotransmitter that underlies
reward processing and learning, peaks in adolescence—supporting known increases in sensation seeking but also
in adaptable learning Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“fMRI”) studies show that adolescent
limitations in recruiting brain systems that support response planning, error processing, the ability to sustain an
executive state, and top-down prefrontal executive control of behavior underlie limitations in executive control
in adolescence. Moreover, adolescents show over-reactivity to reward incentives, thus engaging response
systems that may contribute to impulsive responses in situations with high motivation, Neurobiological evidence
indicating that adolescence is a transitional stage of limited executive control in the context of increased
vulnerability to sensation seeking can inform culpability, long-term sentencing, and greater amenability for
rehabilitation,”).

.

.

.

.

.

.
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sentence under New

York law does not change the Sixth Amendment inquiry.37 If a sentencing judge

would not be authorized to raise the minimum sentence before which a criminal defendant would be

eligible for parole beyond the range authorized by the legislature based on the facts found by the jury—
even if that new minimum were below the lawful maximum range—then certainly neither could an

administrative agency like the Board of Parole, The Atteyne Court found that it was “beside the point” of
the Sixth Amendment inquiry that a seven-year sentence could have been imposed with or without judicial

fact- finding because the jury verdict authorized a sentence within the range of five years to life, 570 U,S. at

.

114 “When a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact

necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury. It is no answer to

. .

.

say that the defendant couldhave received the same sentence with or without that fact ” Id at 114-15

“Whether the judge's authority to impose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specified fact (as in
Apprendi), one of several specified facts (as in Ring v, Arizona, 536 U,S. 584 (2002)), or any aggravating

fact (as here), it remains the case that the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence. The judge
acquires that authority only upon finding some additional fact.” Blakely, 542 U,S. at 305,
The Board of Parole has unconstitutionally enhanced the minimum term of Mr.
sentence—which was 18 years, as

>

s

established by the sentencing judge—based on its own conclusions and

fact-finding about his offense. As it has done on six separate occasions since Mr.

completed his

minimum sentence, in the Decision, the Board asserts its own judgment that additional time for punishment
is warranted and that Mr.

has not served sufficient time for punishment. This is a violation of Mr.

's Sixth Amendment rights, and the Decision must be reversed.
D*

’s Mandatory Maximum Sentence*

The Decision Increases Mr *

The Constitution establishes a punishment ceiling for juvenile offenders because, as the Supreme
Court has held, “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those

37

When the Blakely Court observed that “indeterminate sentencing” does not violate the Sixth Amendment, it was
referring to the selection of a minimum sentence term from within the range authorized by the legislature. See
542 U,S, at 309, Imposing a minimum term above the term authorized by the legislature, as here, violates
Apprendi,
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whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruptionMontgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726. The maximum sentence

allowable for juvenile offenders who are not irreparably corrupt is one that provides a “meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation/’ Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.

The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U. S.
Court, did not overrule the holdings of Miller or Montgomery. Id, at

overrule Miller or Montgomery.”); see also id, at

(2021), in the words of the full
(“Today’s decision does not

(“Miller and Montgomery are still good law,”)

(Sotomayor, J. dissenting).38 The Sixth Amendment thus forbids the Board of Parole from making a factual

finding that would allow the State to constitutionally sentence a juvenile offender to die in prison. The

punishment ceiling is the “‘statutory maximum under Apprendi [ which] is the maximum sentence a judge
5

may impose solely on the basis of thefacts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant

[T]he relevant ‘statutory maximum5 is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding

additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.” Blakely, 542 U,S. at
303-04 (emphasis in original, internal citations omitted). Here, the relevant “maximum” is that established

by the Eighth Amendment,
Put simply, for juvenile offenders, a lifetime of imprisonment is a lawful sentence only for those

who are among the “rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. Mr.

has neither been convicted of nor pled to permanent

incorrigibility. The purpose of guaranteeing the possibility of parole to all but the rarest of juveniles is so
that “their hope for some years of life outside prison walls [ would] be restored” and to “ensure[] that

juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be
forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment,” Id, at 736-37.
Therefore, it is undeniable that the Board may not impose a punishment greater than that allowed under the

Eighth Amendment on the basis of administrative fact-finding. Nonetheless, the Decision does precisely
that by mandating Mr.

38

’s continued incarceration. It should therefore be vacated.

.

Moreover, Hawkins v New York State Dep ’t of Corr , & Cmty , Supervision, 30 N,Y,S,3 d 397 (N,Y, App, Div,
2016) is still controlling precedent in New York State,
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rs EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

THE DECISION VIOLATES MR.
A.

The Decision Violates
s Eightl
,
Failed to Appropriately ConsiaeHvlr

mendment Rights Because the Board
’s Youth at the Time of the Offense.

^

BIH

Mr.

asserts that the Decision violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel

and unusual punishment, does not comport with Supreme Court precedent or New York law as outlined in
Hawkins, 30 N.Y.S.3 d 397, and Rivera, 2019 WL 2030503, and is evidence that Mr.

has not

received a “meaningful opportunity” for release. For these reasons, the Decision should be vacated.
The New York Court of Appeals has concluded, “the cruel andunusual punishments clause is

progressive, and not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by humane justice,,. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” People v. Brodie, 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 124-25 (N.Y.

1975); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding the same). Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment 's prohibition on “cruel and unusual

punishment” prohibits the lifelong imprisonment of juvenile offenders in virtually every case. See
Montgomery v, Louisiana, 136 S Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v, Alabama, 132 S, Ct, 2455 (2012); Graham v.

Florida, 560 U.S, 48 (2010). Except where an offender has shown irreparable corruption, children who
have been imprisoned for crimes committed before they reach adulthood must be given a meaningful
opportunity for release. Anything less amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In 2016, the Appellate Division, Third Department interpreted the procedural requirements set

forth in Montgomery to require an analogous procedure at the parole release hearing stage. Hawkins, 30
N.Y.S. 3d at 400. According to Hawkins, the Eighth Amendment requires that the Parole Board consider

the “significance of petitioner 's youth and its attendant circumstances at the time of the commission of the

crime,” Id, at 399, The court held:
The [ Supreme ] Court has found that, at the sentencing stage, a defendant who
committed a crime as a juvenile is procedurally entitled to a hearing where youth and
its attendant characteristics are considered in order to separate out those who can be
punished by a life in prison from those who cannot. We agree with petitioner that an
analogous procedural requirement is necessary at the parole release hearing stage. For
those persons convicted of crimes committed as juveniles who, but for a favorable
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parole determination will be punishedby life in prison, the Board must consider youth
and its attendant characteristics in relationship to the commission of the crime.

Id, at 400, The court then added that mere acknowledgment of the individual's age at the time of the
commission of the offense is not enough; rather, there must be a deeper “inquiry into and careful
consideration of whether the ‘crime reflects transient immaturity.”’ Id , at 401 n. 7. This inquiry should
consider the individual’s “maturation, or lacktherof, since the time of the crime and in relationship to
becoming an adult.” Id. It must also account for the fact that “ordinary adolescent development diminishes

the likelihood that a juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society.” Id, at 399, This is because

“children are constitutionally different from adults,” Id, at 398,
Hawkins is clear: “For those persons convicted of crimes committed as juveniles who, but for a

favorable parole determination will be punished by life in prison, the Board must consider youth and its
attendant characteristics in relationship to the commission of the crime at issue ” 30 N.Y.S.3 d at 400
(emphasis added). It is axiomatic, then, that both the Eighth Amendment and New York State law require

the Board to meaningfully consider youth when contemplating parole for juvenile offenders. In this case,

.

no such consideration was given by the Board, and therefore, the Decision must be vacated

As is plain from the Decision and the interview transcript, the Board failed to carefully consider

Mr.

’s youth at the time of offense and failed to acknowledge Mr,

’s subsequent growth

and maturation in the three decades since. The transcript of the interview is bereft of any serious or careful
discussion of how Mr.

’s age of 14 years at the time of the crime impacted his actions and

lessened his culpability. In both the hearing and the Decision, the panel merely acknowledged, in passing,
Mr.

’s juvenile offender status, which is insufficient under both Supreme Court and New York

jurisprudence. The Board’s Decision failed to carefully consider whether Mr.

’s crime reflected

transient immaturity, and the Decision must be vacated.
Even if the Board finds that the Board’s Decision did consider Mr.

’s youth, the decision

. During the interview,

must still be vacated, because the Board employed youth in the wrong inquiry

Commissioner Agostini explicitly stated, “[i]f you could do this when you were 14 who knows what you
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could do when you were 15 or something, when you were a kid and not acting in a manner typical of kids.

Kids get their feelings hurt, they get pissed off at their parents, at other people, they don' t do what you did,
that's not common. Your crime is definitely, thank God, not a common crime.” Exhibit 2 at 24:2- 8. Then, in

its conclusion, the Board's Decision notes that Mr.

. Meaning,Mr.

at 3

's crime was “beyond excessive.” Exhibit 22

's young age at the time of the crime was, in the eyes of these Commissioners,

an aggravating factor, not a mitigating factor that indicates lesser culpability, as is required by New York

law and has been proven by neuroscience,39
B,

Mr.

The Decision Violates Mr.l
Decision Fails to Afford Mr ,

Ps Eighth Amendment Rights Because the

Ia Meaningful Opportunity for Release,

asserts that New York's system of parole is unconstitutional as to juvenile offenders

in that it has not and cannot provide him, as a juvenile offender, a meaningful opportunity for release, as

required by United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, and specifically preserves this argument for future
appeals. See Brief of Petitioner,

v. Stanford, Appellate Division Second Department Docket No.

2017-07216, Dutchess County Supreme Court Index No. 50465 / 17 (Jan. 9, 2020) (Ex. 6).

Moreover, the Board's Decision violates Mr.

's Eighth Amendment rights, and denies

him a meaningful opportunity for release because of the panel's finding that Mr.

's release would

deprecate the seriousness of the offense such as to undermine the law. Under New York law, the Parole
Board panel must determine (1) whether, if released, the inmate “will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law”; (2) whether the inmate 's release will be “incompatible with the welfare of society”; or
(3) whether release “will not so deprecate the seriousness of the crime so as to undermine respect for the

law.” Exec L. § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In previous parole release denials (prior to August 11, 2020), the Board

39

Beatriz Luna, The Relevance of Immaturities in the Juvenile Brain to Culpability and Rehabilitation, 63
HASTINGS LJ, 1469, 1483 -84 (2012) (available at:
https://repository,uchastings.edu/hastings_law_ joumal/vol63 /iss6/2) (“Neuroscientific evidence of limitations in
exerting executive control and increased socioemotional reactivity can be seen as providing substantiation for
what has already been known intuitively and supported by psychological studies. What neuroscience adds is
knowledge of the biological mechanisms for how these behaviors occur. Understanding that there are concrete
biological underpinnings to adolescent behavior better informs culpability , , , , The evidence for protracted
maturation of brain systems that support executive behaviors indicates that the vulnerability to impulsive risk
taking behaviors in adolescence is transitional. As such, the propensity for impulsive acts or irresponsibility in
adolescent is a mode of behavior that can be outgrown,”).
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concluded that Mr.

’s release would deprecate the seriousness of the offense such as to undermine

.

respect for the law and that Mr

that Mr.
recent

would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law or

’s release would be incompatible with the welfare of society. In Mr.

denial, the one he is now appealing, the Decision did not find that Mr.

live and remain at liberty without violating the law, or that Mr,

’ s most
would be unable to

’s release would be incompatible

with the welfare of society. Instead, the Decision relies solely on the seriousness of Mr.

’s

offense, which cannot be the sole basis of a decision. But more than rendering the decision arbitrary and

capricious, relying solely on the seriousness of the offense violates Mr.

’s Eighth Amendment

rights.
Recognizing that juveniles are different than adults in many different respects, the United States
Supreme Court has held in a line of cases that the Eighth Amendment places clear limits on the punishment

of youth, and that juvenile offenders, like Mr,

, are constitutionally entitled to a meaningful

opportunity for release, Sw Montgomery v , Louisiana, 136 S. Ct, 718 (2016); Miller v, Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455 (2012); Graham v, Florida, 560 U,S. 48 (2010).40
In Graham, the court categorically struck down juvenile life-without-parole sentences for non-

homicide crimes. 560 U.S. at 74. Two years later, in Miller, the Court extended that prohibition to
mandatory sentences of life-without-parole for juvenile homicide offenders. 132 S. Ct. at 2460. The Court
held that “life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient

immaturity,’’ and “the procedural requirement necessary to implement [ this] substantive guarantee” is a

“hearing where youth and its attendant characteristics are considered.” Montgomery, 136 S, Ct, at 734-35
(citing Miller, 132 S.Ct, at 2471) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
By denying Mr,

Decision denies Mr.

40

’s parole release solely on the seriousness of the offense, the Board’s
a meaningful opportunity for release, and the panel’s decision is entirely

.

.

(2021), in the words
As stated above, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Jones v Mississippi, 593 U S,
of the full Court, did not overrule the holdings of Miller or Montgomery Id at (“Today’s decision does not
overrule Miller or Montgomerysee also id at (“Miller and Montgomery are still good law ”) (Sotomayor,
J, dissenting).

.
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backwards-looking. Regrettably, Mr.
to the

INDEX NO.

will never be able to change the facts of his crime, the loss

victims ’ families, or any of the other decades-old, tragic facts of this case. But the Supreme Court has

deemed life sentences for juvenile offenders unconstitutional, except for the irreparably corrupt, and Mr.
has unequivocally demonstrated that he does not fit that bill.

The record is clear; every single forward-looking factor favors Mr,
was presented with evidence of Mr,

society, including: Mr,

’s release. The Board

’s ability and desire to become a productive member of

’s remarkable disciplinary record over the past 29-plus years; his

successful completion of all rehabilitative programs; his continuing academic achievements, including his

completion of a GED program and his degree from Bard College; numerous letters of support, including
from a community pastor; a positive psychological evaluation by a forensic psychologist; and a low risk

. .

COMPAS score Mr

has also expressed sincere and heartfelt remorse, both at his hearing and in

his submissions to the Parole Board, and to the individuals and families of those impacted by his actions on
the day of the crime. Because the Board’s Decision failed to give Mr,

a meaningful opportunity

for release, the Decision shouldbe vacated,41

.

X

THE PETITION IS NOT MOOT,

“The threshold determination of whether [ a] proceeding is subject to dismissal as moot, which
involves an analysis of whether this matter presents substantial issues that are likely to recur, is intertwined

with that of whether the Board’s determination should be annulled as arbitrary and capricious.” Hill v. New

York State Bd

of Parole, No, 100121/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9462, at * 15 (Sup. Ct, N.Y, Cty, Oct,

23, 2020) (citing Lovell v, N Y, State Div, of Parole, 40 A.D.3 d 1166, 1167 (3 d Dep’t 2007) (holding that

although petitioner’s reappearance before the parole board during the pendency of the appeal " would
normally have necessitated dismissal of the current appeal as moot, an exception to the mootness doctrine

is presented herein inasmuch as a substantial issue is involved, /.e., the failure to comply with the

41

Under New York law, rehabilitated juvenile offenders cannot be subject to life in prison. The Parole Board is no
more entitled to subject an offender to the penalty of life in prison in contravention of this rule than is a
legislature or a sentencing court[,]” Hawkins, 30 N,Y,S,3 d at 400, Mr,
is now serving a defacto life
sentence, in two year intervals, in contravention of his constitutional rights.

^
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provisions of Executive Law § 259-i, which continues to evade review”); McLaurin v. N.YS. Bd. of Parole,
27 A.D.3 d 565, 566 (2d Dep't 2006); (finding mootness doctrine did not apply where petitioner had another

parole hearing as the record shows that the parole board still did not have or consider resentencing
minutes)). Though Mr.

reappeared for a parole release interview on March 9, 2021, the Petition

is not moot. See, e,g , Miranda v, New York Board of Parole, No. 150995 /2020, Decision & Order (Sup. Ct,
N.Y. Cty, Oct. 13, 2020) (“The court finds that it would be an unfair result and a waste of resources to

require Mr, Miranda to commence an entirely new petition just to challenge the proprietary of the Parole
Board's subsequent order when Mr. Miranda's circumstances are nearly identical to those 18 months ago.
Indeed, given that every 18 months the Parole Board conducts a reappearance interview, by the time the

.

.

new petition is briefed and the court gets to it, every petition Mr Miranda files would likely become moot

Thus, this issue certainly will evade review”).

.

A

This Appeal Fits Squarely Within a Recognized Exception to the Mootness Doctrine*

In previous appeals from parole denials, the Board has invoked the general rule that grant of a new

parole interview can moot a challenge to a prior parole denial. See August 2019 Appeal, Dkt. No. 38 at

. .

.

14, 15; Dkt No 64 at TJTJ18- 19 In that case, Respondent further asserted that the recognized exception that

applies when an appeal challenges not merely the Board's weighing of relevant factors, but its complete
and continuing failure to comply with substantial, mandatory legal requirements concerning the parole

determination does not apply here. See August 2019 Appeal, Dkt. No, 64 at 22.42 That analysis is

.

^

..

.

incorrect See McLaurin, 27 A D 3 d 565; Lovell , 40 A,D,3 d 1166; Standley v New York State Div , of
Parole, 34 A.D.3 d 1169 (3 d Dep ' t 2006); see also Marino v. Travisf 13 A.D. 453, 455 (2d Dep ' t 2004)
(finding absence of mootness in light of “substantial issue” that had recurred through parole interviews); In

..

re Melinda £>., 31 A D 3 d 24, 29 (2d Dep ' t 2006) (finding absence of mootness where appeal challenged

42

To the extent the Board asserts here, as it did in the August 2019 appeal, that the Court of Appeals “implicitly
agreecf hat “[ challenges to parole denials do not typically evade review” when it declined to hear Mr
appeal from his fifth parole denial, August 2019 Appeal, Dkt, No, 64 at Ulf 22-23, that analysis is
faulty The Court of Appeals’ decision not to hear a previous challenge obviously has no bearing on a new
Article 78 special proceeding arising from a new parole denial, and as the body of caselaw cited throughout this
Section demonstrates, New York courts routinely apply the mootness exception in the context of parole

.

^
.

.
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“noncompliance with the requirements of Social Services Law § 374-a”); Hill, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
9462, at * 15 -16 (N.Y. Sup. Oct. 23, 2020) (finding that subsequent parole interviews did not moot appeal);

.

..

see also Gonzalez v Annucci , 32 N Y 3 d 461, 470 (2018) (reasserting that “substantial and novel issues that
are likely to be repeated and will typically evade review” are excepted from mootness challenges).

Hill is particularly instructive, 2020 N.Y, Misc, LEXIS 9462. In Hill , argued that “[petitioner’s ]
reappearance before the Board rendered] the prior parole decision moot as once a new final decision of

parole is issued, a parole applicant cannot be granted relief based on a prior allegedly improper parole
denial.” Id. at * 10. Like Mr.

, Hill had an exceptional institutional record while incarcerated, but

the Board denied Hill release because the panel deemed that his “release would be incompatible with the

welfare of society,” in spite of all evidence to the contrary. Id. at * 16-* 17. The court concluded that the

.

matter was not moot because the original and later decisions were arbitrary and capricious It held;

Here, the court finds that the Board’s January 2019 and April 2020 decisions denying
petitioner parole release support a finding that substantial issues exist that will
continue to evade review as the Board’s decisions denying parole present issues as to
whether the Board’s denials were based on the nature and seriousness of the
underlying crime committed by Mr. Hill when he was 19 years old, without
considering other factors under Executive Law § 259-i, , . .

The seriousness of Mr, Hill’s crime and the permanent and tragic effects it had on the
officer’s life are clear, and the decision reflects the Board’s careful consideration of
these factors. The Board’s decision, however, does not reflect the basis of its finding
that Mr. Hill poses a danger to society. The Board failed to articulate the reasons for
this determination with respect to Mr, Hill’s low COMPAS Risks and Needs
Assessment scores or to “provide an individualized reason for this departure,” in
accordance with 9 NYCRR 8002.2 . . . . Accordingly, the court concludes that the
Board’s determination was arbitrary and capricious and irrational bordering on
impropriety ....

The court’s conclusion is supported by the submissions before the Board and its
decision which lacks a foundation for its determination that Mr, Hill, at present, poses
a danger to society, and demonstrates that the Board, while referring to the statutory
factors, did not consider all statutory factors, but focused solely on the underlying
crime.
Id. at * 15 -* 18. (citingRivera, 2019 WL 2030503; Marino, 13 A.D. 453) (finding that the Parole Board’s

determination was “irrational bordering on impropriety” where petitioner appeared several times before the
Board and his release was denied for the same reasons, without new or additional relevant evidence or any
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other submission in support of its determination)). The parallels between Hill and this case are uncanny.
Like Mr. Hill, Mr.

committed a serious crime, but in the time since, he has been an exemplary

inmate, as demonstrated by his impressive disciplinary and educational record. Like Mr. Hill,Mr.
has across-the-board low-risk COMPAS scores, and a strong re-entry plan. Nonetheless, the

Board has offered no explanation whatsoever for why it departed from his COMPAS score.
Similarly, in McLaurin, the petitioner challenged the Board’s failure to consider resentencing

minutes, which he correctly argued constituted a “sentencing recommendation” that the Board was required
to consider under Executive Law §

259-i. 27 A.D.3 d at 566. “After the appeal was perfected and before

oral argument,” the petitioner attended another parole hearing. Id. The Court acknowledged that
"[ o ]rdinarily this would have rendered the appeal academic.” Id. But it declined to dismiss the appeal as
moot because, in the more recent parole hearing, “the Board still [ did] not have the resentencing minutes

and has not considered them.” Id. For that reason, “[ t]he matter presented] an exception to the mootness

doctrine because the substantial issue presented is likely to recur,” Id.
The decisions in Lovell and Standley are squarely in accord. Lovell, 40 A.D,3 d at 1167 (“Although
such a reappearance would normally have necessitated dismissal of the current appeal as moot, an

exception to the mootness doctrine is presented herein inasmuch as a substantial issue is involved, i.e., the

failure to comply with the provisions of Executive Law § 259-i, which continues to evade review.”);
Standley, 34 A.D.3 d at 1170 (noting that when petitioner reappeared during the pendency of the appeal,

“the Board again failed to consider [required] factors,” so that “although petitioner's reappearance would
normally render th[ e] appeal moot, an exception to the mootness doctrine is presented inasmuch as a

substantial issue is involved which continues to evade review,”). Indeed, in Lovell, the Board even
promised to consider the very materials that were the subject of the appeal in an upcoming parole

interview, but the court still found that the mootness exception applied. Lovell, 40 A.D.3 d at 1170. E.g,,
Marino, 13 A.D.3 d 453; Lebron v. Alexander, 68 A.D.3 d 1476, 1477 (3d Dep’t 2009); cf People ex rel.

Donohoe v. Montanye, 35 N.Y.2d 221, 224-25 ( 1974) (same in habeas corpus context). Such an appeal

..

presents a “substantial issue” that is “likely to recur,” McLaurin, 27 A D 3 d at 566, but that will “evade
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review” if the appeal is dismissed, Standley, 34 A.D.3 d at 1170; accord Lovell, 40 A.D.3 d 1166; Marino,
13 A.D.3 d at 455; Lebron, 68 A.D.3 d at 1477; Donohoe, 35 N.Y.2d at 224-25.

This case falls within the established exception applied in the above cases. Mr.

has

argued that the Decision must be vacated for nine separate reasons, as described above, and any single
reason is enough to warrant reversal. Mr,

has thus asserted a plethora of “substantial and novel

issues” that already have been and will continue to be repeated. Gonzalez, 32 N.Y.3 d at 470, If the Petition
were dismissed on mootness grounds, those issues would evade judicial review.
B*

The March 2021 Decision Repeats the Same Errors as the Decision Underlying This
Petition*

When considering a mootness challenge to an Article 78 petition arising from parole denial, the

.

court may consider the outcome of the subsequent hearing that allegedly rendered the petition moot See,

. . Misc. LEXIS 9462, at * 15. Given that “[ t]he threshold determination of whether this

e.g., Hill, 2020 N Y

proceeding is subject to dismissal as m o o t . . . is intertwined with that of whether the Board's determination
should be annulled as arbitrary and capriciousf,]” that consideration must necessarily evaluate the new

determination. See id, Mr.

asserts that the March 2021 denial decision has repeated the same

errors that render unlawful the Decision underlying this Petition. See Exhibit 24,43 These repeated errors

demonstrate unequivocally that, had the Petition been dismissed as moot, substantial and novel issues
would evade judicial review.

XL

THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ORDER RELEASE

In previous appeals from parole denials, the Board has asserted that the Supreme Court lacks the

authority to order Petitioner be released. See August 2019 Appeal, Dkt. No. 64 at 1} 20. Although the basis
for that assertion is clear, see, e.g,, Friedgood v. New York State Bd, of Parole, 22 A.D.3 d 950 (3 d Dep ' t
2005), a careful reading of both the statutory grant of authority to this Court and case precedent indicates

the opposite. In fact, there are seven reasons why this Court can and should order release.

43

For brevity, Mr,
will reserve argument as to the details and implications of the repeated errors unless
and until Respondent seeks dismissal of this Petition on mootness grounds

.
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First, the assertion that Article 78 courts may not order release directly contradicts enshrined

principles of statutory interpretation. Second, the 2017 parole revisions instilled a liberty interest in parole
procedure. Third, the ability of courts to convert habeas corpus proceedings into Article 78 petitions is

indicative of judicial authority to order release in this context. Fourth, given that parole determinations are
mixed criminal and administrative proceedings, and in light of the presumption of lenity, any ambiguity in

the law must be read in Petitioner's favor. Fifth, unlike administrative decisions that are made by agencies
that possess some expertise that the court lacks, (a) the Board of Parole possesses no such special expertise,
and is staffed by political appointees without any parole-specific special training; and (b) the underlying
conviction and sentence originate with the judiciary, not with the Board of Parole, which distinguishes the
Board from agencies that make initial determinations, such that the Supreme Court is suitably positioned to

overrule the Board. Sixth, the Board's interpretation of Article 78, as articulated in the August 2019
Appeal, amounts to a violation of Petitioner 's right to due process under law pursuant to the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and New York statutory and constitutional law,
thus rendering the statute unconstitutional as interpreted. Seventh, logic and public policy considerations
cannot be ignored: it would be

abhorrent to conclude, as Respondent urges, that the judiciary lacks

authority to correct an ongoing violation of Petitioner 's constitutional rights.
A.

Basic Principles of Statutory Interpretation Demonstrate That Previous Decisions on
This Issue Are Erroneous *

.

1

Plain meaning, context, and legislative history demonstrate the breadth of this
Court’s authority *

Well-settled principles of statutory interpretation demonstrate this Court's authority to order Mr,

.

rs immediate release Recently, the Court of Appeals summarized those principles:

When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration
is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature, As we have often
explained, because the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the
starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving
effect to the plain meaning thereof. We are also guided in our analysis by the familiar
principle that a statute must be construed as a whole and that its various sections must
be considered together and with reference to each other. Additionally, we should
inquire into the spirit and purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of
the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history.
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Town of Aurora v. Village of East Aurora, 32 N.Y.3 d 366, 372 (2018) (internal citations omitted).

Likewise, “construction should not be utilized to eviscerate the very purpose for which the legislation was
enacted [ and]... [ a] court should avoid a statutory interpretation rendering the provision meaningless or

defeating its apparent purpose /’ Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, No. 2010-06556, 2011
WL 6825539, at * 5 (2d Dep’t 2011) (quoting State v, Cities Service Co., No. 64300, 1992 WL 34289 (3 d

Dep't, Feb. 20, 1992)), “It is the spirit, the object, and purpose of the statute which are to be regarded in its

interpretation.” Id. (quoting Westchester County Soc.for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Mengel, 266

..

..

A D 151 (2d Dep’t 1943), affd, 292 N Y 121 (1944)).

Article 78, pursuant to which Petitioner seeks relief, states the following:
The judgment may grant the petitioner the relief to which he is entitled, or may
dismiss the proceeding either on the merits or with leave to renew. If the proceeding
was brought to review a determination, the judgment may annul or confirm the
determination in whole or in part, or modify it, and may direct or prohibit
specified action by the respondent. Any restitution or damages granted to the
petitioner must be incidental to the primary relief sought by the petitioner, and must
be such as he might otherwise recover on the same set of facts in a separate action or
proceeding suable in the supreme court against the same body or officer in its or his

official capacity.

....

C P L R § 7806 (emphasis added). The language of the statute evinces its purpose: to permit courts like

this one to right wrongs committed by administrative decisionmakers, such as the Board of Parole, by

directing or prohibiting any action. See generally Siegel, N.Y. Prac. § 570 (6th ed.). And the administrative
decision need not merely be annulled or confirmed by the judge evaluating it; it may be directly modified.

The plain meaning of the text leaves no doubt: this Court has the power “to render any judgment

appropriate to the case.” Id. (emphasis added).

.

Context 44 also favors this interpretation When Section 7806 is examined within the larger body of

law that enumerates the powers of the Article 78 court, the breadth of the court’s authority is

incontrovertible. Contempt, when necessary to enforce an Article 78 ruling, is within the purview of the

.

.. . .

.. .

.

court See C P L R § 5104; 6 A N Y Jur 2d Article 78 § 403 Injunctive relief is also within judicial

44

.

.

.

See, e g., Gundy v United States, 139 S.Ct 2116, 2126 (2019) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme,”)

55
70 of 84

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 05/27/2021 11:33 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 3

INDEX NO.
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/27/2021
FUSL000094

authority. See Policemen's Benev. Ass'n of Westchester County, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Village of
Croton-on-Hudson, 21 A.D.2d 693 (2d Dep't 1964). Likewise, the Article 78 court may convert a

procedurally improper form of filing, as required, see Siegel, N.Y. Prac. § 570 (6th ed.) (“[ T]he relief [ can

be ] shaped to the case without ... regard to form.”), and it has the power “to review abuses of discretion as
to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline,” which has been deemed to include the power to reduce a

punishment imposed by an agency as the court sees fit. Id, (citing C.P.L.R. § 7803(3); Mitthauer v.
Patterson, 8 N.Y.2d 37 (I960)), In fact, the judgment powers enumerated in Section 7806 for Article 78

“special proceedings” are notably more fulsome than the counterpart provision for judgments in an

“action.” Id, (citing C.P.L.R. § 5011) (“[With the language in Section 7806,] the legislature is merely
assuring that the court has the requisite power to render any judgment appropriate to the case. If the record
is complete enough to enable the court to render a final judgment on the merits, the court will do that; if the
case entails a correction of errors and requires further proceedings by the respondent, the correction will be

made andback will go the case,”).

Similarly, the legislative history 45 of Article 78 proceedings demonstrates the breadth of the court's

authority. The forms of relief encompassed by Article 78 are age-old:
The common-law remedies of certiorari to review, mandamus, and prohibition are
remedies of ancient origin derived from the English law which, at an early time,
became part of the law of New York with such modifications as our basic law made
necessary. When the former Civil Practice Act was adopted and became effective in
1921, the remedies of certiorari to review, mandamus, and prohibition were continued,
but the writ practice was abolished in favor of an order. In 1937, the legislature
combined the remedies under a proceeding against a body or officer in Article 78 of
the former Civil Practice Act. The former CPA Article 78 was in turn superseded in
1963 by N.Y. Article 78 of the C.P.L.R. which provides that relief previously obtained
by writs of certiorari to review, mandamus, or prohibition must be obtained in a
proceeding under Article 78, and that wherever in any statute reference is made to a
writ or order of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, such a reference must, so far as
applicable, be deemed to refer to the proceeding authorized by this article. Article 78
proceedings exist primarily to afford relief to parties personally aggrieved by
governmental action.

45

.

See, eg,, Kimmel v State, 29 N,Y,3 d 386, 397 (2017) (“Although the plain language of the statute provides the
best evidence of legislative intent, the legislative history of an enactment may also be relevant and is not to be
ignored, even if words be clear because the primary goal of the court in interpreting a statute is to determine and
implement the Legislature’s intent,’ ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
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6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 1 (citing Dunne v. Harnett, 92 Misc.2d 48 (Sup. Ct. 1977), off d, 59 A.D.2d

1065 (1st Dep’t 1977)) (other citations omitted). In other words, “[ t]he intended purpose and effect of

Article 78 ... was to simplify and unify the procedure in connection with the three old remedies of

certiorari to review, mandamus, and prohibition and to wipe out technical distinctions which hampered the

.

.. .

court in granting relief for proved grievances ” 6 N Y Jur 2d Article 78 § 2,

.

A discussion of mandamus is instructive The word mandamus derives from Latin, and means “we

command,” 6 N,Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 79. Mandamus relief —a remedy of “ancient origin derived from the
English law which, at an early time, became part of the law of New York,” see 6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 §
1—“grants a higher court supervisory authority to command an inferior court, tribunal, board, corporation,

.

.. .

.

or person to perform a particular duty required by law ” 6 N Y Jur 2d Article 78 § 2 ( citing Bresnick v

Saypol, 57 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1945), modified on other grounds, 270 A.D. 837 (1st Dep't 1946)). Both

historically and today, mandamus is available where there is a “clear legal right to the relief sought,” Id,
(citing Gonmler v, Annucci, 136 A.D.3 d 909 (2d Dep’t 2016); see also Dinsio v. Supreme Court, 125

..

A D 3 d 1313 (4th Dep’t 2015)); 24 Carmody-Wait 2d § 145:375 (citing People ex rel Perdue v, Jablonsky,

174 Misc.2d 604 (Sup. Ct, 1997) (noting that the Article 78 court may use its mandamus power to compel

action by the Commissioner of the State Department of Correctional Services)). Meaning, when the

legislature codified Article 78, it empowered the Article 78 court to invoke its mandamus power to compel
a body (the Board of Parole and/or the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision) to act

(release Mr.

.

on parole) or to refrain from taking an action (continuing Mr

?

s

incarceration) that is in contravention of law (the Eighth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, Section 25 9-i,
and all the other laws cited by Petitioner). Id, (citing Bailey v. McDougall, 66 Misc.2d 161 (Sup. Ct, 1970),

affid, 36 A.D.2d 903 (2dDep’t 1971)),
2*

Caselaw concerning the Article 78 court 9s authority to order release is
erroneous, such that this Court may decline to follow precedent

All modes of statutory interpretation—the plain language of Section 7806, its context within the

larger framework of New York statutory law, and the legislative history underlying Article 78—
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demonstrate that this Court is well within its authority to order Mr.

>

.

s release Although some

New York courts have concluded otherwise, a close examination of that precedent demonstrates that it is

.

erroneous and should not be followed, in spite of stare decisis

Recently, the Supreme Court addressed how stare decisis should be managed in the face of
erroneous precedent.

Stare decisis promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual
and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Of course, it is also important to be
rightf.]

Gamble v, United States, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In
his concurrence, Justice Thomas added:
It is always tempting forjudges to confuse our own preferences with the requirements
of the law, and [misinterpretation of the stare decisis principle] exacerbates that
temptation by giving the veneer of respectability to our continued application of
demonstrably incorrect precedents. By applying demonstrably erroneous precedent
instead of the relevant law 's text . . . the Court exercises “force” and “will,” two
attributes the People did not give i t , , . . When faced with a demonstrably erroneous
precedent, my rule is simple: We should not follow it.

Id, at 1981- 84 (Thomas, J, concurring) (citing The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961))
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Justice Thomas's sentiment has been explicit in New York

jurisprudence for decades. See Matter of Simonson v, Cahn, 27 N,Y,2d 1, 3 (1970) (“The doctrine of stare

decisis does not enjoin departure from precedent or preclude the overruling of earlier decisions.”). Though
valid appellate precedent is generally binding on trial courts, see, e.g., People v. Turner, 5 N.Y.3 d 476
(2005), “stare decisis does not require blind deference to flagrant error.” Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d
138, 148 (1977) (Jasen, J. concurring). See also Peoplev. Hogan, No. 18, 2016 WL 633920, at * 8 (2dDep' t

Feb. 18, 2016) (Rivera, J. dissenting) (quoting People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 338 (1990)) (“Stare decisis
is not meant to fit the Court like a straightjacket and to prevent mistakes from being rectified. While ‘a
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court should be slow to overrule its precedents, there is little reason to avoid doing so when persuaded by

the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning/ ”).46

The cases that state the principle that Article 78 courts cannot order parole release are
demonstrably incorrect. To begin, most state the conclusion sui generis, merely citing to previous cases that

have also stated that principle, without providing any further reasoning to support the conclusion. See, e.g.
Matter of Newton v, Dennison, 47 A,D,3 d 538 (1st Dep’t 2008); Quartararo v. New York State Div, of

Parole, 224 A,D,2d 266 (1st Dep’t 1996). On the rare occasion reasoning is provided, it is imported from
another area of administrative law that has nothing to do with parole. See, e.g., Rossakis v. New York State

Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3 d 22, 29 (1st Dep’t 2016) (citing to a case about vehicle repairs). And if the case is
from the last 25 years, the string of supporting citations invariably leads back to a 1994 Court of Appeals

.

case that does not actually support the proposition: King v New York State Div

. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788

(1994). King does not say that courts are restricted in their ability to order remedies in an Article 78

preceding. Id, at 790, It merely affirms a First Department case, which itself does not make any assertions

about the power of the Article 78 court, and simply says that “the Parole Board should have the opportunity
to make that

determination using the appropriate standard,” without citing any supporting material. King v.

New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 435 (1st Dep’t 1993). Thus, reliance on King is misplaced.
And to the extent cases on this issue predate King, they typically point to the statute and assert something

like “[t]he proper remedy is a judgment directing the board to give the reasons as demanded by petitioner.”

Speedv. Regan, 50 A.D.2d 1100, 1100 (4th Dep’t 1975); see also Licitra v. Coughlin, 93 A.D.2d 349, 352
(3rd Dep’t 1983). In short, this body of precedent is either without analysis, or it relies upon a faulty

premise.47

46

47

Petitioner has found no easelaw holding that a trial court judge must follow precedent that the judge believes to
be erroneous. In light of that fact, Petitioner respectfully asserts that to the extent precedent is incorrect, as are
the cases on this issue, that precedent is not <cvalid” and binding on lower courts,
Additionally, Petitioner respectfully asserts that this case is distinguishable from precedent insofar as Petitioner
has challenged his continued incarceration on the grounds that he is being denied the meaningful opportunity for
release owed to all juvenile offenders based on Supreme Court precedent, and not merely because the Board of
Parole misapplied the statutory factors bearing upon release. Petitioner has found no easelaw holding that a trial
court cannot order immediate release in the precise circumstances presented by this case, which are unique and
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Yet even if statutory interpretation did not render previous caselaw on this issue erroneous, where

the conditions surrounding the establishment of an original precedent have so changed as to render strict

adherence to that precedent harmful or detrimental to society, New York law is unequivocal: a court faced
with original precedent may dispense with the rule. Simonson, 27 N.Y.2d at 3 (holding that “where the

principles announced prove unworkable or out of tune with the life about us, at variance with modern-day
needs and with concepts of justice” a court may disregard stare decisis and overturn precedent);

Grifenhagen v, Ordway, 218 N.Y. 451, 458 (1916) (holding that reversal of precedent may be appropriate
where, “through changed conditions it has become obviously harmful or detrimental to society”). Indeed,

“[a] rule of law which is out of tune with life about us and at variance with modem needs and with concepts
of justice and fair dealing should be disregarded.” 28 N.Y. Jur. 2d Courts and Judges § 232 (emphasis

added) (citing Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 (1969); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656 (1957); Rakaric
v, Croation Cultural Club, 76 A,D,2d 619 (2dDep' t 1980)), Given (1) recent jurisprudence concerning

juvenile offender punishment in Hawkins, 30 N.Y.S,3 d 397; (2) modem scientific knowledge concerning

criminology and the juvenile brain;48 (3) the egregious circumstances presented by this Petition, and (4) the
is merely one of hundreds, if not thousands, of similarly situated juvenile offenders

fact that Mr,

in New York,49 strict adherence to precedent is undoubtedly detrimental to society.

.

present a potential constitutional conundrum Thus, Petitioner respectfully argues that there is no precedential
48

.

authority barring this form of relief
See, e g., Morgan Tyler, Understanding the Adolescent Brain and Legal Culpability, American Bar Association
(Aug 2015) (available at https://tinyurl com/yy3 j7b4b) (last visited Jan 11, 2021); Coalition for Juvenile
Justice, Adolescent Brain Development, at Section 1 2 (available at https://tinyurl com/y24ct4a7) (last visited
Jan 11, 2021); Alexandra O Cohen and BJ Casey, Rewiring juvenile justice: the intersection of developmental
neuroscience and legal policy ,Massachusetts General Hospital, Center for Law, Brain & Behavior (Feb 2014)
(available at https://tinyxirl.com/y5mj6qpt) (last visited Jan 11, 2021).
As of January 2016, the most recent year for which data could be found, 632 New Yorkers were serving life
sentences for offenses they committed between the ages of 13 and 17 See American Civil Liberties Union, False
Hope: How Parole Systems Fail Youth Serving Extreme Sentences (Nov 2016) at 24 (available at
https://tinyurl com/r9r4epc) (last visited Jan, 11, 2021); Editorial Board, New York Forgets Its Juvenile Lifers,
New York Times (Mar 24, 2018) (available at https://tinyurl com/t2y66jn) (last visited Jan 11, 2021), New
York also has a significantly higher number of juvenile offenders serving life sentences than almost any other
state See The Sentencing Project, Still Life: America's Increasing Use of Life and Long-Term Sentences (May 3,
2017) (“Indeterminate life sentences for juveniles are most heavily concentrated in California, Texas, New York,
and Georgia, Together these states account for 63% of the total population of those serving [life with parole ] for
crimes committed as juveniles ”).

.
.

.

.

49

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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Further, concluding that this Court lacks authority to release Mr.

would be inconsistent

with the Article 78 court 's remedial authority in other contexts. Numerous cases outside the context of

parole demonstrate the court’s authority to fashion remedies beyond remand. See, e.g., Brunner v. Russia
182 A.D.2d 1136, 1136 (4th Dep ' t 1992) (“Where a duly constituted administrative board has imposed a

penalty, the court in an article 78 proceeding may determine that the penalty imposed was excessive and
state the maximum penalty the record will sustain”); Police Benev, Ass’n of State Trooper v, Vacco, 253

..

A D 2d 920, 921 (3rd Dep't 1998) (citing Hartje v, Coughlin, 70 N,Y,2d 866 (1987) (“Where, as here, the

record is complete enough to enable the Court to render a final judgment on the merits, remittal is not

appropriate, especially where the agency is merely seeking a second chance to reach a different

determination on the merits”)); Maier v. Coughlin, 193 A.D.2d 1015, 1015 (3 d Dep ' t 1993)
(“Expungement of inmate's record in connection with alleged assault on another inmate was appropriate

remedy, as opposed to remittal for rehearing, for denial of inmate’s right to call certain witnesses at hearing,

where significant amount of time had passed since incident, and one witness was dead and another had

been released on parole,”); Girard v, Glens Falls, 173 A,D,2d 113, 118 (3rd Dep't 1991) (“[I]n instances
where remittal for a new hearing would be unfair under the circumstances ,,, the appropriate relief is not
remittal but outright annulment”). One First Department case that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,

Matter

of Pantelidis v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, is noteworthy. 43 A.D.3 d 314 (1st Dep' t

2007), ajf’d, 10 N.Y.3 d 846 (2008). The Pantelidis court held;
Beyond question, judicial deference to administrative authority and expertise is an
important principle, as illustrated by the decisional law cited by the dissent. Such
deference does, however, admit of some elasticity, especially where a foil
administrative record is in existence, the agency has had an opportunity to rule on all
issues, and the matter, although within the agency's purview, does not require
resolution of highly complex technical issues.

Id, at 317 (emphasis added).50 While none of these examples involve a case wherein a court mandated that
the Board of Parole release a prisoner, they nonetheless demonstrate that the categorical assertion that

50

Petitioner asserts that there is a fully developed record underlying this Petition; the Board of Parole has had the
opportunity to rule on all issues, as evidenced not just by the denial underlying this case, but also by the six
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Article 78 itself prevents any remedy other than remittal is invalid. This Court can and should order
Petitioner's immediate release.
B*

The 2011 Parole Revisions Instilled a Liberty Interest in Parole Procedure*

In general, “when a State establishes a sentencing scheme which creates a legitimate expectation of

early release from prison, there does exist a liberty interest which is entitled to constitutional protection,”

People ex ret Herbert v. New York State Bd, of Parole, 97 A,D,2d 128, 131 ( lstDep’t 1983), In 2011,
significant amendments were made to the state parole statutes and the regulations governing parole.
Compare N.Y. Exec. Law. § 259-c (McKinney 2012), with, N.Y. Exec. Law. § 259-c (McKinney 2010)

and N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i. Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the pre-amendment

.

.

.

statute did not create a liberty interest, see Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed App 'x 825, 826-27 (2d Cir 2014)

(“[W] e considered the effect of the pre-amendment statute and regulations together in 2001 and found no

due process interest in parole,”), in the years since, New York federal courts have recognized the viability
of the argument that the newly amended New York laws create a liberty interest, such that due process

protections apply to parole proceedings. See, e,g,, Linares v, Annucci, 710 Fed. App ’x 467, 470 (2d Cir,
2017); Kindlerv. City of New York, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160253, at * 13 -14 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2019).

Petitioner thus asserts: (1) the 2011 amendments to the statute and regulations surrounding parole created a
liberty interest; (2) pursuant to that liberty interest, Mr.

has a right to due process; (3) Mr.

rs right to due process has been and continues to be violated by the Board of Parole; and (4) this

Court has authority to order Mr.
C*

.

rs release as a remedy to those due process violations

The Ability of Courts to Convert Habeas Corpus Proceedings into Article 78 Petitions
is Indicative of Judicial Authority to Order Release*

Courts considering petitions from incarcerated New Yorkers have notable procedural flexibility.

See, e.g,, 6 N.Y. Jur, 2d Article 78 § 341 (collecting cases concerning judicial authority to procedurally

modify claims by incarcerated persons). Where appropriate, a court may convert a state postconviction

precedent denials and eighth subsequent denial from March 2021; and, as discussed infra, the Board of Parole
has no special expertise and makes decisions based upon politics, not specialized knowledge or insight
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habeas corpus petition into an Article 78 petition. See, e.g., Piersma on behalf of Majors v. Henderson, 44
N.Y.2d 982 (N.Y. 1978); Peopleexrel South v. Hammock, 80 A.D.2d 947 (3 d Dep’t 1981); People ex rel.
Ganci v. Henderson, 54 A.D.2d 609 (4th Dep’t 1976). Likewise, a habeas corpus petition has been deemed

.51 See, e.g., People ex rel Yates v. Walters, 111

an appropriate vehicle for challenging a parole denial

..

A D 2d 839 (2d Dep't 1985), Thus, the parameters some appellate decisions have erected around the Article

78 judge’s remedial authority are inapposite for two reasons. First, the power to convert between the two

proceedings suggests that the New York Supreme Court possesses broad procedural flexibility in the

. Second, the forms ofrelief available in habeas

context of releasing those who are wrongfully incarcerated

corpus petitions are available in Article 78 parole petitions. With respect to the latter, a habeas petition

permits a wide range of remedies. See, e.g , People exrel. Rosenthal v. Wolfson, 48 N.Y.2d 230, 232 (N.Y.
1979) (reversing bail denial and setting a specific amount for bail); People ex rel Merced v. Warden, Otis

Bantum Correctional Ctr ., No. 250538/07, 2008 WL 211530019 (N.Y. Sup, Ct, May 19, 2008) (granting

release from custody); People ex rel Spencer v, Goord, 179 Misc. 2d 85 (Sup, Ct. 1998) (granting
immediate release). Thus, this Court’s remedial authority is, at the very least, coextensive with its authority

.

to address a petition for habeas corpus, and the Court therefore has authority to order Petitioner ’ s release

D*

The Rule of Lenity Supports This Court’s Authority to Order Release*

Parole determinations are not purely administrative; at best, they are mixed criminal and

administrative proceedings.52 In recent years, courts examining federal administrative law have begun to
acknowledge that the deference given to administrative decision-making—pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc , v, Nat Res , Def Council Inc., 467 U.S, 837 (1984) and similar cases —is improper in the context of
criminal liability. See, e.g,, Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3 d 1019, 1027 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J.

51

52

To be clear, Petitioner is not requesting that the Court convert this Article 78 special proceeding to a petition for
habeas corpus. Petitioner is merely citing to the Court’s inherent authority to make such conversions as further
evidence that the Court has broad and flexible remedial authority
For avoidance of doubt, Petitioner reaffirms his argument that he holds a liberty interest in parole release
following the 2011 amendment to New York’s parole laws, that he has a right to due process that is being
ritually violated by the Board of Parole, and this argument as to the quasi-criminal nature of the agency
proceeding is made arguendo.
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concurring) (“Chevron has no role to play in construing criminal statutes . . . . The application of Chevron
to

criminal laws also would leave no room for the rule of lenity, a rule that resolves ambiguities in criminal

statutes in favor of the individual and a rule of construction that Chief Justice Marshall described as

‘perhaps not much less old than construction itself.'”). Moreover, where a rule or statute may have
criminal, rather than just civil implications, courts are bound by the rule of lenity to resolve a point of

ambiguity in favor of the person facing the potential criminal consequences. See US, v. Thompson/Center
Arms Co,, 504 U.S. 505, 518 (1992); see a /so U,S, v. Scully , 108 F. Supp. 3 d 59, 108 (E.D.N.Y, 2015)
(quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004)) (“When ... a statute has both criminal and

noncriminal applications, the Supreme Court has stated the rule of lenity applies.”).
This Petition arises under a complex framework of laws and regulations, each of which has
criminal implications for Mr.

. Among others, they include; the statute and sentencing laws

pursuant to which he was sentenced; the Board of Parole's agency authority, as codified in statutes and

regulations, to make decisions concerning parole release; the United States Constitution, and the rights it
imparts on juvenile criminal offenders and criminal defendants generally; and the grant of authority to this
Court to review parole decisions pursuant to Article 78. Obviously, the agency decision-making at issue

here has direct criminal consequences for Mr.

. When he is denied parole release, his

incarceration continues, despite his rehabilitation and fitness for release.53
And if this Court lacks authority to order Mr.

's release, the criminal implications for Mr.

are even more egregious. Not only would he be subject to continued incarceration and a ninth,

farcical parole denial decision. Worse, he couldbe left without recourse in the courts to challenge the
Board's authority as an agency. Meaning, the statutes this Court must interpret in the case at bar are not
merely civil; they have momentous criminal implications for Mr.

. Insofar as the remedial

authority to the Article 78 judge is ambiguous under this body of law,54 those laws may not be interpreted

53

54

In light of this, Petitioner respectfully asserts that this Court need not adhere to the type of deference to agency

decisions that is afforded in Article 78 proceedings that lack criminal implications.
Petitioner reasserts that there is no ambiguity, and this Court has clear authority to order Petitioner’s release.
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in favor of the government (meaning, with deference to the agency and its interpretations of the law).

Instead, the rule of lenity mandates that the body of statutory law underlying this Petition be read inMr.

's favor, and this Court find that it has authority to order release.

.

E

The Board of Parole Lacks Any Special Expertise That Might Undermine the
Article 78 Court’s Authority to Overrule Board Decisions,

There are situations in which individuals with a specialized set of skills or expertise make agency

decisions (for example, at the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation). Where agency
decisions address, as the Pantelidis court put it, “highly complex technical issues,” or where the underlying
determinations originate with an agency and not with a court (for instance, in the case of a local zoning
dispute), it is fathomable that an Article 78 judge may be poorly positioned to stand in the shoes of the

.

..

.

agency and remittance for reevaluation may be prudent 43 A D 3 d 314 But there are no such

considerations here.
1*

Politics, not expertise, underlies the Board of Parole*

As noted above, see Section X, the New York Board of Parole is made up entirely of political

appointees; there is no requirement that appointees possess specialized expertise or training-in psychiatry,
psychology, criminology, law, or otherwise- for appointees to qualify for positions on the Board; and the
primary qualifier for appointment (and reappointment) appears to be the would-be Commissioner 's ties to

politicians. Likewise, not only are the appointments purely political; the Board's decision-making is
heavily influenced by politics.

Thus, in the first instance, Commissioners have no special expertise that would enable them draw

factual conclusions concerning whether a potential parolee is truly rehabilitated or whether he poses a
danger to society. They are guidedby politics, not by expertise, (Indeed, the Commissioners ' ongoing
refusal to credit the expert opinion concerning Mr,

rs obvious rehabilitation, which was presented

in a detailed report from a forensic psychologist, directly underscores the political nature of their decision-

making.) To wit, Petitioner has been unable to find any requirement that, before appointment,
Commissioners be educated-or, post-appointment, that they receive training about key advancements in
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modem science that bear upon the parole inquiry, such as the lesser criminal culpability of juvenile
offenders, the phenomenon whereby offenders “age out” of crime, the correlation between poverty, abuse,

and crime, etcetera. See, e.g., Exhibit 8, 9. In light of these facts, there is simply no valid policy concern to

be raised that the Supreme Court may need to defer to the “expertise” of the Board of Parole, even if review
of administrative decisions in other contexts may implicate such concerns.
Parole disputes originate in the court system, making judges appropriate arbiters
of disputed parole determinations *

2*

Some Article 78 petitions challenge administrative decision-making that originate within the
context of the

administrative agency. For instance, the New York State Parks, Recreation and Historic

Preservation might deny an applicant a permit to hold an event at a park on Long Island, To the extent a
legal dispute arose from that denial, the issue could be considered to have originated with the Parks agency.

The same might be said of disputes involving zoning boards, education-centric agencies, and the like. By

.

contrast, the issues raised in Article 78 petitions from parole denials do not originate with an agency Parole

applicants only become parole applicants after a plea or conviction, which happens in the Supreme Court.
Thus, from a policy perspective, it would be irrational to suggest that this Court lacks authority to overrule

the Board, as Article 78 judges are in fact the most appropriate arbiters of disputedparole decisions.

.

F

Interpreting Article 78 as Curtailing Judicial Authority to Order Release Renders the
Statute Unconstitutional*

Insofar as the Board asserts that this Court lacks authority to order release pursuant to C,P.L,R, §

7806, that interpretation renders the statute unconstitutional as applied to Mr,
?

,

Specifically, Mr,

s rights to substantive and procedural due process under the United States and New York

Constitutions have been violated, and he has been denied Equal Protection under the law.

G.

Logic and Public Policy Considerations Mandate the Conclusion that Article
78 Judges Have Authority to Order Parole Release *

.

In opposing Mr

's Petition seeking to vacate the Board's sixth denial of parole release,

which has not yet been decided, Respondent asserted that this Court lacks authority to do anything more
than remit this matter the Board of Parole for a new hearing wherein, presumably, the same violations of
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law will repeat for a ninth time. Exhibit 21 at 17:17- 18 (“The only remedy available is a de novo ...

interview /’). That interpretation of the law defies not only logic, but sound public policy. Respondent’s

.

argument is tantamount to asserting that the New York Supreme Court lacks authority to enforce the law

Indeed, followed to its logical conclusion, Respondent has effectively argued that the Court lacks authority
to enforce the United States Constitution and protect the constitutional rights of incarcerated New

Yorkers,

Not only is this argument folly in light of supremacy principles 55 and New York law,56 but if accepted, it

.

amounts to a concession that Section 259-i is unconstitutional Simply put, if New York judges cannot

enforce the United States constitution to protect the rights of juvenile offenders incarcerated in a New York

prison, then Section 259-i empowers the Board of Parole to violate the rights of those offenders by keeping

them incarcerated indefinitely, without a meaningful opportunity for release, and without access to judicial
review of release denials. In that case, the law itself is unconstitutional because state law cannot strip

citizens of their constitutional rights. Thus, insofar as the Court agrees that it lacks authority to order Mr,
’s immediate release, Petitioner asserts that Section 259 -i is unconstitutional as to juvenile

offenders and must be deemed invalid.
CONCLUSION

“Parole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal

expectation in the vast majority of cases.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983). The Decision

underlying this appeal is arbitrary, capricious, and unconstitutional. The conclusion that Mr.

’s

“undermine respect for the law,” Exhibit2 at 44:17, is no more than an attempt to circumvent the forwardlooking process that parole is supposed to follow, and to continue resentencing and re-punishing him for his
offense of conviction. It is nonsensical to suggest that granting parole release to a clearly rehabilitated
man—a man who has a stellar disciplinary record, substantiated growth and maturation, and reasonable

55

“Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, state laws that conflict with federal law are
without effect and are preempted,” Birdsong v. Nurture, Inc ,, 215 F, Supp, 3 d 384, 387 (E.D.N.Y, 2017)

..

56

(quoting Altria Grp,, Inc v Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008)).
As noted above, Article 78 judges are empowered with procedural authority as to both habeas and Article 78
petitions Arguing that the Article 78 judge nonetheless lacks authority to order release over the objection of the
Board of Parole is thus inconsistent with the larger body of New York law as to this issue.

.
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plans for successful reintegration into society—somehow undermines the law. To the contrary, releasing
Mr.

is the only lawful course of action, and what would undermine the law would be to permit

this Decision to stand when its irrationality runs contrary to the very purpose of the parole system.57

The Decision can only be described as pre-determined, arbitrary, capricious, irrational, improper,
and a violation of Mr.

?

.

s right to due process of law For all of the foregoing reasons, Petitioner

respectfully requests that the Court annul the decision of the Parole Board and order release.

57

Pursuant to New York law, rehabilitated juvenile offenders cannot be subject to life in prison. The Parole Board
is no “more entitled to subject an offender to the penalty of life in prison in contravention of this rule than is a
legislature or a sentencing court [,]” Hawkins, 30 N,Y,S,3 d at 400, Mr,
respectfully argues, and
preserves for future appeals, that he is now serving a defacto life sentence, in two -year intervals, in contravention
of his constitutional rights

.
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Dated: May 27, 2020
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